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*G. Csepeli, A. Örkény***NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EUROPE (Part I)**

The paper describes the stock of knowledge of modern national identity identifying various elements such as spontaneous national identity based on categorization, thematizations, typifications and relevances, interpretive structures, attitudes, symbols, values, probabilities and national ideology. All these elements are embedded in the semantic universe created by the name of the nation. Empirical results are presented to demonstrate the varieties of national experience across Europe.

Keywords: national identity, stock of knowledge, cross national comparison, empirical investigation.

The Knowledge Base of National Identity

The nation forms part of social existence and if language is the “house of being”, as Heidegger [16] has suggested, the nation would have no place in this house without the linguistic tools helping its members believe that nations exist and they belong to one that is their own.

As established earlier in this book, the nation becomes conceivable to its members as well as non-members via its name. The name of the nation marks individual to belong into it. The negative word “not” is also significant since it allows to draw a dividing line between things that are in positive versus negative relationship with the nation. National semantic universes are as many as nations themselves [1].

The first delegates to the first Roma World Congress held in London in 1971 were well aware of the significance of naming when they decided to choose a name for themselves. This was the event where the designation “Roma” came into being, devoid of the negative connotations of the earlier term “Gypsy” (Zigauner, cigány etc.). This name provided the ground for the Roma nation building by opening up the possibility for an extremely fragmented and diverse ethnicity, living all over the world, to identify its members as such, and thus construct and cultivate a shared identity.

Any fact of our physical reality may be transposed into the metaphysical world merely by placing it into the semantic space evoked by the nation’s name. Whether taking our own or another nation’s perspective, any theme can easily and clearly enter the national knowledge base via the adjectival structures thus formed [2]. It is through the adjectival structures that utterances like “English weather”, “Hungarian vizsla”, “Dutch landscape”, “Russian summer” or “Chinese panorama” (fig. 1.) gain tangible reality – and any number of similar examples could be given to illustrate this point.



English weather



Hungarian vizsla



Dutch landscape



Chinese panorama

Fig. 1. Adjectival structures

The human world fragmented by names into groups enables us to “own” a place somewhere that we may call home – a place that seems close and familiar to us both in time and physical space. The social identity theory by Tajfel et al [29. P. 149-177] stresses the significance of categorization focusing on one’s group, which organizes the human world cognitively and affectively, thereby offering individuals a sense of order, security, and identification. In the case of categorization by name the outcome is a spontaneous national identification that is immediate, taken-for-granted, requiring no justification. People considering themselves members of a particular nation inhabit an environment graspable in space and time and prone to be experienced and communicated through national thematizations for the members of both present and future generations. The thematizations of nature, for example, make possible the incorporation of the landscape and some of its components (for example, rivers, mountains, lakes or seas), the weather as well as plants and animals into the nation’s knowledge base.

As the “national gaze” has produced the environment inhabited by members of the nation, the anthropological thematization has created the human bodies whose build, clothing, and community constitute and “live” the events of national existence. Such events appear in contexts spawned by a great variety of thematizations for the nation’s members. History evokes the times of the dead for the present time, portraying scenes of conflict and harmony, relating stories of epochal change, as well as “great men” and the nameless. The theme of culture contributes to the nation’s capacity of giving meaning and making the epistemological power of difference to the knowledge base [18].

The themes of politics, law, society, economy, and the military offer the opportunity for the nation to exhibit its achievements and highlight its values for its own and other peoples [13]. Due to their visibility and communicability in the international arena, sports are of utmost significance. Of the themes from everyday life, food, drinks, sex, fashion, and leisure are most suited to represent the peculiarities of the nation. The usefulness of these themes can be aptly illustrated by the commercials produced to boost tourism for international audiences.¹

Thematizations merely disclose what happens or has happened on the national stage and they convey scarcely anything about qualities and values that could offer guidance to the nation's members as to what would serve the nation and what would not. Evaluations take place with the help of relevances determining what is good or bad in the nation’s life and what’s attractive and unattractive in national performance. Psychological relevances facilitate the assessment of traits attributed to the national character. Economic relevances ascertain the relative share of particular economic areas in the nation’s life such as industry, agriculture, commerce, and services. Political relevances ascertain the limits of desired and undesired behaviors and occurrences in themes like statehood, legislature, and conformity to the law. With regard to international thematization, relevances determine whether the nation’s members would follow the principle of national self-centeredness or interdependence [20].

Typifications enabling the nations’ members to view “typical” features as essential national characteristics will render fuzzy and vague differences noticeable and visible. National attitudes are forged and cultivated on the ground of relevances and typifications. It is through these national attitudes that an individual can make sense of the nationally constructed reality in every theme. Not only would they reckon to know a particular object but, in assessing it in the force field of attraction and repulsion, they would be able to instantly place it as well. Moreover, in their acts and behavior, they would follow the “suggestions” of the attitudes’ mental components. The mapping of attitudes is in the axis of survey research into national consciousness and sentiments is, and through it a sociological snapshot can be taken of the actual concepts that a population holds true about their nation and identity [4].

Stereotypes are pivotal components of the national knowledge base, making ideas about one’s own and other nations accessible [17]. A late 18th century guide to Europe’s nations has been preserved (see fig. 2), which links each people with characteristics along a set of surprisingly well-selected criteria.

The inside walls of Styria’s inns were decorated with the so called *Völkertafel*’s pictures and delineations, which allegedly represented Europe’s nations. Styria, laying as it does on the border of Europe’s western and eastern regions, could have hosted in its inns guests who traveled from east to west or vice versa – travelers curious about what to expect in their journeys to different lands.

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lySnQRmQbiM> (last download: 12/28/2016).



Fig.2. A Brief Characterization of European Peoples

Table 1 represents eleven peoples along seventeen dimensions. Even by contemporary standards, the selection of dimensions seems insightful. Particular emphasis was placed on the psychological and behavioral aspects, which included morals, temperament, character, knowledge, and religiosity. Negative traits, military virtues as well as leisure activities and the things admired (referred to as “relevances” in modern language use) were mentioned separately. Clothing, too, received its own row, demonstrating the author’s awareness of the adage that “fine feathers make fine birds.” Illnesses were included supposedly to guide the traveler about primarily sexual encounters with individuals of various nationalities. The picture also informed the reader about what each country abounded in; what animal was associated with its residents; and, finally, what kind of death the members of particular nations could typically expect for themselves.

The Turks and the Greeks were depicted as one people, while the information imparted to the other nine nationalities was featured in separate columns. As to the substance of the information, it appears quite distinctive for each national group; and, even in our days, they would not be dramatically different. The travelers, however, may not have made much of the author’s typing of the Spaniard as arrogant; the French as civilized; the Italian as wimps; the English as daring on the seas; furthermore, the Polish as boastful, the Hungarian as rebellious, the Russian as rude, and the Greeks-and-Turks as dishonest! Yet these detailed accounts may likely have helped to pin each nationality onto the travelers’ cognitive map. In many cases they merely reinforced what they had reckoned to know through prior experiences or hearsay.

Overall, the pictures caution to be distrustful towards every nationality, the difference being the unique set of reasons for distrust and caution. Entertainment might have been another purpose of the compilation, especially considering the last line where the various kinds of deaths typical of a nation were listed, or the mention of goods and animals generally held characteristic of them.

Table 1

A Brief Characterization of European Peoples

	Spanish	French	Italian	German	English	Swedish	Polish	Hungarian	Russian	Turkish or Greek
Morals	vainglorious	tireless	servile	candid	shapely	strong and big	rude	dishonest	evil	capricious
Temperament	wonderful	honest, garrulous	jealous	tends to be good	amicable	cruel	mad	cruel	as the Hungarian	fiendish
Wits	clever	thoughtful	quick-witted	smart	confused	obdurate	vain-glorious	small-witted	none	considerable
Character	manly	childlike	adaptive	playful	feminine	unknowable	lackluster	mad	excessively rude	mellow
Knowledge	literate	militarily versed	theologically versed	versed in jurisdiction	secular knowledge	humanities	foreign languages	Latin language	Greek language	shrewd political skills
Clothing	appropriate	motley	appropriate	imitate	French-like	leather	long tail	garish	fur	feminine
Negative features	arrogant	fraudulent	corrupt	prodigal	restless	superstitious	boastful	crook	always suspicious	fraudulent
What do they admire?	fame and glory	war	gold	drinking	sex	good food	nobility	revolt	beatings	themselves
Illness	constipation	syphilis	bad disease	gout	tuberculosis	hematoma	inguinal hernia	epilepsy	whooping cough	depression
Country	fertile	civilized	picturesque and beautiful	good	fertile	hilly	sylvan	rich in gold and fruits	icy	kindly
Military virtues	generous	cunning	foreseeing	invincible	hero of the seas	intrepid	impasioned	rebellious	dull	lazy
Religion	religious devout	rather religious	moderately religious	pious	variable	fervent	faithful	indifferent	renegade	No better than the others
Ruler	king	king	pope	emperor	one or the other	country lords	elected king	barons	pretenders	tyrant
What is abundant?	fruits	trade	wine	corn	pasture	ore	furs	everything	bees	light and soft goods
Leisure	games	betrayals	gossiping	drinking	working	eating	arguing	doing nothing	sleeping	complaining
Animals	elephant	fox	bobcat	lion	horse	ox	bear	wolf	monkey	cat
How do they die?	on ship	in war	In a cloister	In wine	in waters	on the ground	in a stable	by sword	In snow	by treachery

Recent research into stereotypes sets out with assumptions no different than the Völkertafel's images. Stereotypes help recognize the members of a group, both in terms of their empirically observable features and the non-observable ones that one infers [20].

Besides physical attributes, contemporary studies of stereotypes concern assumptions about morals and competency. Our investigations based in the region of the Carpathian basin indicated that national and ethnic groups' stereotypes of themselves and one another vary according to a distinctive pattern along the east-west axis. The groups in the "east" are viewed by "westerners" as less competent but morally more sol-

id, while the groups in the “west” are rated in the exact opposite manner, as highly competent but of inferior morality. The study furthermore confirmed the thesis about autostereotypes being more positive than heterostereotypes [6].

Interpretations facilitate the operation of the national knowledge base and the sorting of information perceived in a national context. They make it possible for us to apprehend, experience, and communicate the reality constructed on national categories with the help of thematizations, relevances, and typing. Furthermore, interpretations enable one to evaluate problems, dilemmas, attempted solutions and actions within the nation’s dramaturgical space – a space peopled by heroes and traitors, filled with an array of grand achievements, successes and failures, tragic and victorious events.

The socially constructed world becomes mentally bifurcated through dichotomization: one’s own nation occupies the “familiar space”, whereas other nations, cultures, and civilizations are relegated to the “unfamiliar space” and are viewed through the lens of one’s own national group as strange, remote, and often threatening.

Rationalization is a well-known psychological mechanism the purpose of which is to protect the self by, first, keeping things that are incongruous with the positive self-image at a distance and, second, by discarding such items once they pop up. This mechanism is “turned on” whenever facts, information or communication eroding the positivity of national identity arise. National rationalization knows no other truths than its own. Consequently, every nation would privilege self-justifying rationalizations and stave off alternative perspectives which would hold the nation accountable for mistakes and failures that transpired. At the opposing end of national pride and rationalization is self-loathing and the admission of guilt and shame, a relatively rare occurrence.

Creating and sustaining a consistently positive national self-image depends on properly identified causes that emphasize the nation’s own attributes like its creative force, intelligence, and heroism when it comes to its successful endeavors. On the contrary, mostly outside agents – such as foreigners, minorities or enemies – are blamed for the nation’s failures. Of particular relevance is scapegoating through which the causes of social ills become palpable and immediately graspable.

Compensation is rooted in a sense of inferiority, which may surface on both an individual and a collective level. Compensation occurs when the national performance lags behind other, similarly positioned nations’ performance in empirically quantifiable areas (for example, economic growth, living standards, the number of victories scored in battles and wars and so forth). What compensation enables for the nation’s members is a sense of national superiority over members of other peoples concerning any arbitrarily selected areas such as the size of the hunted stags’ antlers or the number of Olympic golds per capita. The same social psychological mechanism lies behind the cliché of “small country of great accomplishments.” The ultimate dread of national existence for a nationalist is the prospect of extinction, and members of the national community are mobilized to fend it off via faith in collective survival and hope for the future.

Symbols constitute a vital part of the national knowledge base in that they convey, on a non-rational level, a sense of belonging, common fate, and timeless existence to the community. Flags, coat-of-arms, anthems, and other national symbols are indispensable requisites of the scripts enacted on festive events. The roles of the script provide the opportunity for all participants to unite under the sacred idea of the nation.

The revered sites of national past such as the heroes’ tombs and birthplaces are also charged with symbolic power, a reason why nations struggle so bitterly to reconcile themselves with relinquished territories related to epochal historic events, the birth, life, or death of the protagonists of national culture and history. The capital of every modern nation state has a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which serves as a veritable catalog of essential patriotic symbols.

National ideology is the most elaborate yet the least accessible segment of the national knowledge base in terms of its social reach, being as it is a system of explicitly and elaborately stated ideas. Its rationale is to provide justification for the nation’s existence. The closed version of national ideology is exclusive and restrictive with regard to its membership, proclaiming separateness and national self-centeredness. The open version, in contrast, is an inclusive system of ideas striking a balance between nationality and human rights. While the closed type is centered on ethnic and biological ties, the open is grounded in the notion of citizenship.

The Sociological Model of the Knowledge Base of National Identity

It was with considerable delay – in the second half of the twentieth century – that the social sciences set out to study the problem of the nation more systematically. Social psychology was the first to achieve consider-

able progress in revisiting the issue of national identity. It defined the nation as a social group, hence the assumption that the specificities of national belonging may be captured in the framework of inter-group relations. The most favored research questions addressed the concept of national identity itself; the roots and development of identity in individual psychology; the examination of ethnic and national attitudes; the depiction of inter-ethnic relations as well as the study of stereotypes [15], prejudices and conflicts [24. P. 347-391]. Not until recently did sociology engage with similar questions. The first systematic international empirical investigation took place in 1995 with the purpose of offering a sociological explanation for the problem of national identity. Prior to this, research had been conducted, by and large, in individual countries starting in the mid-1980s.

Sociology's delayed interest in this topic may be traced back to the discipline's long-standing proclivity to conceptualize social differences and inequalities with reference to socioeconomic groups and principles of stratification. Only since the 1960s have cultural systems and group formation rooted in these systems received increased attention. In addition, sociologists' reliance on data collection from individual subjects – both in micro or macro-level surveys – also hindered the growth of this area, since national identity studies focus on collective consciousness and thus draw on symbolic and narrative data. The current popularity of this topic, on the other hand, is well-served with the increasingly common inclusion of symbolic and cognitive phenomena in the depiction of social conflicts. Furthermore, in the explanation of collective behaviors, the organization of cultural identity, double or plural identities, and social conflicts with symbolic or cultural roots have come to the fore [22. P. 33-61].

The knowledge base of national identity may be approached, firstly through various historical, political, and cultural components; secondly, it may be investigated through the political and intellectual process whereby the knowledge is formed and changed; and its fabric is shaped, rewritten, and transformed by a variety of actors. Thirdly, the knowledge base can also be studied as a collection of representations such as national symbols, objects, texts, and events. Finally, and for our project it is of crucial importance, that the elements of everyday knowledge and mechanisms of identification are also uncovered and analyzed in their temporality. The subjects of our inquiry are thus ordinary people, and our primary goal is to reconstruct the particular image of the nation as it coheres in the individual's consciousness of observations, attitudes, and value judgments. We are furthermore interested in the manner these components congeal into a unified knowledge-based identity on the societal level.

In order to "belong" to a nation and grow attached to it, the individual must develop some kind of relationship to his or her (national) group, in our case, to the Hungarian people. Evidently, everyone builds a sense of belonging via positive sentiments and values, otherwise the importance and meaning of national affiliation would be challenged. If the fact of birth into a nation assures one's national affiliation in the legal sense, affective and cognitive contents must "fill" and reinforce one's national identity in a psychological sense.

The existence of one's own group presupposes that other groups exist as well of which people develop an opinion, too. In the next step of identification, not merely a sense of difference between one's own group and that of the others becomes palpable, but the difference from the members of other groups acquires negative features. That is how generalizations and stereotypes are formed such as, for example, the belief that Hungarians are talented and educated, while others are lazy and primitive, therefore the Hungarians are superior to others. This exemplifies the first level of a classic ethnocentric worldview whose essence is holding one's own group in high regard and squarely deprecating the other. Ethnocentrism does not quite amount to nationalism unless ethnocentric ideas pervade the full range of the community's activities, functioning in effect as a systemic ideology. In such cases nationalism governs a country's political orientation as well, including its economic, foreign, and cultural policies [22. P. 33-61].

Our inquiry into the everyday social psychological characteristics of national consciousness and national identity is based on the model elaborated by György Csepeli [4] in his research studies of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as its modified version employed in Henk Dekker's [10] studies. National identity, according to this model, may be construed as a cognitive and affective body of knowledge, consisting of tightly linked elements and thus cohering into a unified structure. The shape of this structure is a pyramid that represents the frequency and intensity of each element's occurrence in society (fig. 3).

On the primary level of attachment, one can find spontaneous emotional identification fostering a feeling of closeness to the group defined by the nation's members. Onto this emotional base is grafted a diverse set of attitudes, inclinations, values, and ideologies that organize identity. Through various categorizations, attributions, stereotypes, ethnocentrism and nationalism, the nation as a social group gains the particular shape and substance that comprise the framework for psychological identifications – ranging from the most

instinctive to the increasingly conscious ones. The cognitive and the affective patterns may evoke a variety of themes encompassing the natural environment, the construction of historical past, and the central issues of culture, politics, the economy, and ethics.




Fig. 3. The pyramid structure of the elements of national identity

Following the logic outlined above, we will explore the characteristics of national knowledge base, drawing on the results of an international comparative survey conducted in 2013. Since the survey was conducted several times over the past 25 years, we had the opportunity to observe the changes that had occurred over the periods between 1995, 2003, and 2013. In the first part of our account, we will examine the psychological components of national identity; subsequently, we will proceed to look at the various expressions of national sentiment and mentality along the entire "pyramid". Lastly, in the third part of our analysis, we will discuss how the different social psychological components affect nationalism's penetration of one's everyday consciousness and, on that grounds, what types of attachment individuals display towards their nation.

About the Research

Our investigation rests on the data of the 2013 International Social Survey Program's comparative research series, occasionally complemented with data from the 1995 and 2003 surveys². These studies inquired into the specificities of national identity in various countries of the world including those of Europe; addressed the issue of how people perceived strangers and internal minorities; and, finally, questioned whether anything pointing beyond national identity such as a transnational or supranational identity could be seen to arise.

A most aggravating dilemma in international comparative research is to figure out the methods with which to compare the information and data gleaned from individuals in nationally-based sociological studies. Understandably, international research significantly alters the contextual space of the conventional sociological inquiry by expanding the interpretive field construed on the individual level (methodological individualism³) onto culturally and politically constructed collective symbolic interpretive spaces. These spaces include the community of nation states; the supranational space of political and cultural communities; the regional level of similarities and differences in terms of geography, history and politics; and, lastly, the political and

²For more detail, see www.issp.org (last download: 12/28/2016)

³ The concept of methodological individualism was introduced by Schumpeter (1909); it refers to approaching social phenomena through studying the individual's characteristics.

economic associations organized above the level of nation states such as the European Union (methodological nationalism⁴). Besides national attachments and identities, the relationship to Europe and the issues of European identity represent a problem that can only be approached by viewing them at the intersection of all the mentioned interpretive spaces. The citizens of the modern world socialized into national communities are pressured in this way to come to terms with their personal relationships to Europe and its various regions, all in the context of emerging new collective identities and old residual ones that either fade away or seek to survive under new circumstances.

Whereas international comparative research projects date back to the early 1960s, they only entered the canon of officially accepted sociological perspectives with the 1987 general meeting of the American Sociological Association, which highlighted the comparative paradigm as the meeting's main theme. In his programmatic speech, Mr. Melvin L. Kohn [19. P. 713-731], the ASA's president at the time, distinguished between four types of such investigations. In the first one the nation itself is the object of study; in the second, the nation is the context of the research; the third type conceptualizes the nation as a research unit; and the fourth type addresses transnational relations. The earliest international comparative projects belonged to the first category, conceived as they were, within an epistemological paradigm where the focus of inquiry was society organized in the framework of the nation state. The question to which this type of research raised was whether the observed sociological phenomena exhibited differences from country to country. In a wide variety of themes these studies aimed to call attention to the specific – diverse – patterns of political, economic, and social institutions and phenomena in individual countries. The second type of comparative effort went further to examine the degree to which the workings of various social institutions and structural processes could be generalized, and whether in explaining them, their national context does or does not play a role. Classic examples of this approach include the study of stratification and social mobility of industrializing societies. The genuine paradigm shift, however, came along with the third and fourth types of studies where the similarities and differences between countries served as the initial assumption for addressing questions like 'What, beyond a universal or individual vantage point, is the contribution of various types of nations and countries to the grasping of particular issues?' and "Are there shared or divergent cultural specificities that explain people's ways of thinking and behavior beyond their national context?" [22. P. 33-61].

Significant developments occurred in the sociological study of national identity in a number of countries during the 1980s. They did not, however, go beyond exploring the nature of concepts such as the nation, national attachment, and nationalism within the confines of the nation state, in conjunction with their historical political, social and psychological background and peculiarities. The first impulse to develop a more complex comparative paradigm dates back to the ISSP research in 1995. Certainly, the ISSP's unparalleled data bank offers an exquisite opportunity for the in-depth study of any country's national identity with the help of quantitative methods. It furthermore facilitates research beyond the national idea in terms of its ideological, political, historical, symbolic, and narrative dimensions to examine the social psychological and value-related facets of people's ties toward their nation [14]. Our own analysis is more ambitious in that we attempt to uncover the more comprehensive cultural and structural trends corresponding to the third and fourth types of Kohn's scheme.

The ISSP series of research relied on national representative samples and questionnaire-based surveys from numerous countries all over the world. The large number of European participant countries afforded us to test the contemporary relevance of Szűcs's [28] theory regarding Europe's three historically formed regions. Likewise, we were interested in the plausibility of his distinction between the "political" and "cultural" nation. In our book [7] drawing on data from 1995 and 2003, we developed an analysis which only partially corroborated such a distinction.

Both in the first and second rounds fifteen European countries participated; in 2013 the number of participants increased (see table 2)⁵.

⁴ Methodological nationalism refers to grasping social phenomena by taking into account the effects of the nation state as a framework and the global transnational processes. The description and comparison of collective cultural characteristics, according to this approach, offers a path to understanding complex social processes. (Wimmer–Schiller 2003).

⁵ Germany's data bank traditionally marks the west and east German territories, thus offering the opportunity to compare the respective relationships between the political past and national sentiments. Given our current focus on the present and the recent past, we did not separate the two sets of German data but instead analyzed the common sample of the new Germany unified in the wake of the regime change.

In the present analysis respondents' attitudes in twenty-three European countries will be compared regarding issues like national affiliation and supranational identity. These countries accurately represent the nations that originally formed the European Union or joined it soon after its establishment; the mixed group of countries admitted in several rounds of the Union's enlargement; and, the postsocialist states joining in the last enlargement.

Given the notably broader international participation in the third round of the investigation, we chose a different, regional classification, one more differentiated and sensitive to differences than Szűcs's [28] three-fold typology. Taking into account the original theory's historical, political, and cultural criteria, we set up a system of European regions. Our decision was motivated not merely by our concern with the knowledge base of national identity but by the special significance we attributed to the European context and identification with the European Union.

Table 2

Countries participating in the research in 1995, 2003, and 2013

1995	2003	2013
Austria	Austria	-----
-----	-----	Belgium
-----	-----	Croatia
Czech Republic	Czech Republic	Czech Republic
-----	Denmark	Denmark
-----	-----	Estonia
-----	Finland	Finland
-----	France	France
Germany (eastern part)	Germany (eastern part)	Germany (eastern part)
Germany (western part)	Germany (western part)	Germany (western part)
Great Britain	Great Britain	Great Britain
Hungary	Hungary	Hungary
-----	-----	Iceland
Ireland	Ireland	Ireland
Italy	-----	-----
Latvia	Latvia	Latvia
-----	-----	Lithuania
The Netherlands	-----	-----
-----	-----	Norway
Poland	Poland	-----
-----	Portugal	Portugal
Russia	Russia	Russia
Slovakia	Slovakia	Slovakia
Slovenia	Slovenia	Slovenia
Spain	[defected data]	Spain
Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
-----	-----	Switzerland
-----	-----	Turkey

We have arranged the examined 23 countries into six regions.

(1) The first region "EU core countries", has been set up to include the core countries of the European Union (Belgium, France, and Germany), plus Switzerland.

(2) The second region "Northern EU countries" consists of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, irrespective of EU membership).

(3) The third region "Southern EU countries" includes two Mediterranean countries (Portugal and Spain).

(4) The placing of the post-Soviet central and eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) into one separate region, "Central European countries", seemed a sensible choice.

(5) Another region, "off-the-continent EU countries", has been identified to include the two island nations (Great-Britain and Ireland) and, finally,

(6) Russia and Turkey constitute a separate region.

Considering their geographical situation, history, pattern of modernization, political history, and a number of cultural features, we assumed that, besides their differences, the countries of each region share a great deal of characteristics. The identification of six regions offers an interpretive framework to study the various patterns of intensity with which people are attached to Europe. Furthermore, the question as to whether citizens dwelling in different regions have (or don't have) faith in a unified European future will be addressed as well.

International quantitative comparative projects pose multiple methodological difficulties which nationally-based studies working with homogeneous samples do not have to address [11, P. 209-230]. Let us discuss one in detail, the representativeness of the sample. As established earlier, the individual countries' research studies tend to be based on national representative samples. However, since we are dealing with regions, a problem is presented by large deviations in population size among the countries of the specific region. When comparing regions rather than countries, we set up weighted sample units proportionate with the size of the populations involved. In attempting to represent the entire continent, we weighted the regions as well in order to reconstruct the effect mechanisms in an accurate manner.

Spontaneous National Identity, Membership in the National Group, and Pride in One's Nation

In discussing the structure of national knowledge base, we argued that one's spontaneous national identity is the Archimedean point on which the entire affective and cognitive structure of national self-identity is built. Clearly, however, the identity of men and women grown up in modern society consists of multiple dimensions, merely one of which has to do with national affiliation. In the framework of the ISSP research one question concerned the extent to which respondents attributed differential importance to various categories of self-identification. Unfortunately, in the 2013 survey this question was dropped from the questionnaire due to time constraints. Given the availability of the 2003 data, we wish to present its results, since it is unlikely that measurable change would have been recorded ten years later.

Table 3 exhibits the relative weight attributed to criteria forming one's social identity in 16 countries.⁶ Respondents were asked to choose among ten criteria of identity formation the three most important ones. The frequencies of occurrence of the single most important criterion are presented below.

A look at the table will show that the majority of people, when supplied with a range of identity categories, would by no means select nationality as their top choice. Generally, Europeans place their role in the family as the most significant, followed by their professional and gender roles.

The respondents' social identity is determined to the largest degree by categories whose potency lies in everyday life. Categories removed from everyday life contribute far less to one's identity. Merely 8 per cent of the interviewees appear to be identified primarily via their nationality. Countries, however, exhibit great variability: in Finland, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Slovenia 10 per cent or more chose the nation as their primary object of identification as opposed to the rest of the countries where this figure was considerably below 10 per cent. The preeminence of the nation in identity formation appears quite small in Denmark, Lithuania, eastern Germany, Russia, and Sweden.

Hungary was no exception to this trend where family ties were particularly strongly emphasized, along with regional belonging and professional identity. Surprisingly, however, age also featured here more than in other nations. As well, Hungarians ascribed more significance to ethnicity than to nationality: while virtually no one mentioned national identity in the first place, ethnicity was the primary consideration among 8 per cent of respondents. Russia exhibited a similar picture with a particularly high relative importance attached to ethnic identity (10 per cent).

The nation is not the exclusive platform on which a feeling of closeness rooted in spontaneous identification is centered. The neighborhood or district where a person grew up or is living forms the most immediate circle associated with security and familiarity. This is followed by a circle larger than the neighborhood but narrower than the nation: one's region. The broadest spatial reference of identity is the continent.

⁶ Germany's data bank traditionally marks the west and east Germany territories, thus offering the opportunity to compare the respective relationships between the political past and national sentiments. Given our current focus on the present and the recent past, we did not separate the two sets of German data but instead analyzed the common sample of the new Germany unified in the wake of the regime change. This question was not featured either in 1995 or 2013. In this particular case we retained the distinction between the two regions of Germany.

Table 3

**The relative importance of criteria attributed to social identity formation;
the criterion considered most important 2003 (in percentage)**

Country	Occupational affiliation	Ethnic group affiliation	Gender	Age	Religious affiliation	Political party affiliation	National affiliation	Families	Social class affiliation	Local regional affiliation	No answer
Austria	17,2	5,0	8,8	2,5	3,9	1,0	8,5	39,0	3,1	5,5	5,6
Czech Republic	26,0	4,2	15,3	8,9	2,3	0,9	8,5	25,6	3,1	4,6	0,5
Denmark	7,4	0,8	3,4	2,0	1,4	0,5	3,5	41,3	1,0	1,2	37,5
Finland	13,8	1,0	5,4	5,4	2,4	0,9	12,4	10,5	1,4	1,5	45,3
France	13,6	6,9	19,7	5,5	4,2	1,8	14,7	18,7	5,5	5,9	3,5
Germany (eastern)	17,8	4,1	18,3	5,5	1,6	0,0	5,3	24,5	3,4	5,7	13,7
Germany (western)	14,7	5,1	13,3	4,1	3,1	1,1	3,1	27,8	2,0	3,8	22,1
Great Britain	9,1	1,7	7,0	3,0	2,2	0,2	6,7	40,6	1,5	1,4	26,7
Hungary	13,0	7,9	7,0	12,0	3,1	1,2	0,3	31,9	5,7	11,7	6,5
Ireland	14,5	2,9	7,9	2,8	7,4	0,5	14,9	37,3	0,7	3,8	7,4
Lithuania	22,4	12,2	8,0	10,1	2,9	0,0	1,2	35,3	4,1	2,6	1,2
Poland	16,0	1,6	9,2	3,8	9,6	0,3	12,0	29,9	2,3	4,0	11,2
Portugal	12,7	2,7	18,0	5,4	3,2	1,1	14,7	29,6	1,9	5,5	5,2
Russia	25,5	10,2	8,5	8,0	2,1	0,6	2,9	27,5	6,5	7,2	1,0
Slovakia	14,5	1,5	10,9	3,7	12,2	0,6	4,8	40,6	0,8	6,4	4,0
Slovenia	17,5	11,4	9,8	5,9	2,8	0,3	10,0	24,4	1,6	11,6	4,7
Sweden	7,0	0,4	6,5	2,1	1,1	0,7	2,8	24,6	0,4	1,3	53,1
Average	15,9	4,9	10,4	5,5	3,8	0,7	7,7	29,3	2,9	5,0	




Fig. 4. Local, regional, national, and continent-based identities, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)

In the ISSP study the local, regional, national, and continental identity was assessed through answering one question (fig. 4). Respondents had to check, on a four-point scale, the degree of closeness felt toward their immediate region, their country, and their continent. (The maximum closeness was marked with 1 and the minimum as 4.)

We were interested in the degree of closeness depicted with the broadening circles of spontaneous identification within the European Union. The heights of the columns on fig. 5 show the distance reported by our respondents to feel toward their country and Europe, respectively. The higher the value of the column, the larger is distance felt toward the residence, their immediate region, their country, and their continent. Correspondingly, the closer the value, the smaller is the distance perceived toward these spaces of identity.




Fig. 5. Spontaneous affective identification in Europe, 2013 (averages on a 4-point scale)

The most general characteristic of European societies is the powerful affective binding capacity of national identity indicated by the consistency of values between 0.6 and 0.8. However intense are the processes of globalization and the European integration, the nation as a communal space and an identity-forging relation has not significantly faded over the past decades. This finding is supported by the lack of sizable shifts across the data recorded in 1995, 2003, and 2013. However, the two island nations, Great Britain and Ireland – lumped together in one group based on geography – display considerable divergence. In Ireland the sense of belonging is much stronger both on the local (0.9) and the national (1.7) levels than in Great-Britain where we found a strikingly low value (2.0) in comparison to other European countries.

In contrast to the "nation", Europe as a continental and cultural space shows a very weak spontaneous affective potential for identification. In the core countries, Northern and Southern Europe as well as in the Central European region, the perceived affiliation is of medium strength, while in Russia and Turkey an appreciable sense of distance was detected (2.3 and 2.4, respectively). Despite living in a country partially belonging to Europe, for Russia's and Turkey's residents, the continent appears remote in an affective and psychological sense (see fig. 5).

Furthermore, it is remarkable how removed, three years prior to Brexit, Great Britain's residents felt toward the continent. This was hardly a fresh development. The surveys of 1995 and 2003 already indicated

a similar trend, which we called the "island effect" [5. P. 3-36]. In 1995 the figure for the perceived distance from Europe was 1.9; in 2003, it was 1.8. Through time-based comparison we detected another intriguing trend: As opposed to the Brits, the Irish and the Scandinavians grew increasingly close to Europe (for 1995: 1.7; for 2003: 1.5, and for 2013: 1.4).

Comparisons of regions, however, tend to conceal the differences among individual countries. In every region some countries exhibited stronger national adherence than others as exemplified by Denmark, France, Iceland, and Norway. In contrast, the national ties are weaker than the average in countries like Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Portugal, and Spain displayed intense identification with Europe – compared to the average – while the figures for the Baltic states, especially Latvia, were low.

To conclude, in every region the national bond is the most powerful one. With the exception of Great Britain and Ireland, the distance felt toward Europe has evened out among the EU member countries during the first decade of the 21st century. This is remarkable considering that the 2003 data suggested that the EU core countries showed the lowest level of spontaneous identification in contrast to the prospective EU countries, which were filled with hopes and positive sentiments. By 2013, apparently, the illusions about membership in a common Europe in Southern and Central Europe were shattered by the realities of belonging.

Within the elements of the national knowledge base, the ISSP survey also interrogated the criteria on which respondents relied to determine membership in the nation. In each country the survey intended to uncover the "substance" of national membership: who may or may not be considered part of the nation. Respondents ranked the relative degree of importance attributed to the following criteria: birthplace, citizenship, residence, native tongue, religion, the fundamental political and legal principles characteristic of the given country, a subjective sense of belonging and self-identification, and, finally, ethnic and national origins. For each criterion, they used a four-point scale, which we transformed into a 100-point one for easier interpretation. The more importance attributed to a component, the higher value was assigned to them on the scale.

On fig. 6 we present the data received in the EU regions, Russia and Turkey.




Fig.6. Criteria of national membership: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a hundred-point scale)

As can be read off the chart, with the exception of religion and ethnic/national origins, each component was deemed quite significant for our respondents. In every country there were many who listed a number of criteria as simultaneously contributing to national membership. Requiring several criteria for such membership implies posing, intentionally or not, difficulties for those pursuing, for whatever reason, the goal of becoming part of the national community. The less criteria mentioned, the less exclusive their concept of nationality may be, since to meet fewer criteria is obviously easier than meeting many.

Citizenship, language proficiency, and the freedom of choosing one's identity ranked important in every country. Of the three criteria language proficiency – whether native or acquired – stood out as almost unanimously supported. (The only exception was represented by Ireland where the majority did not consider this factor important.)

With respect to the other components of national membership, however, interesting differences could be observed. Moving from west to east, religion and ethnic background appear to gain in relative significance. Owing to secularization religion barely matters in the western region. Strikingly only 20 percent or less of respondents connected religion and national identity in Belgium, France, Finland, and Sweden. In Russia and Turkey, in contrast, a fairly large proportion of research subjects thought religious identity to be bound up with nationality (68 and 84 per cent, respectively). A comparison over time threw a light on the conspicuous growth of religion's relevance between 1995 and 2013. Especially notable is the bump around 2003, which may be associated with a shift occurring in Russia's political outlook and the tightening of the nexus between the state and the Orthodox Church. Even more marked is the divergence between the "west" and the "east" of Europe with regard to ethnic descent. Again, moving eastward, ethnicity as a determinant of national identity and national boundaries matters increasingly. (Yet our data do not indicate the total lack of ethnicity's importance in the western regions. Sweden is the only country to demonstrate a unanimous and extreme rejection of ethnic background as relevant to one's national membership. In the rest of the countries responses were divided with a generally moderate emphasis placed on this criterion.)⁷

The "West" displays the opposite trend. Here political loyalty and the constitutional idea of citizenship plays a prominent role at the expense of religion and ethnicity. (In France and Sweden virtually everyone appears to agree that belonging to the nation presupposes unconditional political loyalty.) Compared to the other regions, respondents in the EU's core countries and Scandinavia set less of an expectation for a person to have been born in the country to be considered a first class citizen. A preference or dismissal of a person as would-be citizens based on their birth on the nation's territory is a reliable predictor as to which regions of Europe would accept or reject refugees and migrants. The countries situated off the continent, such as Great-Britain and Ireland, display a less inclusive mindset than the Western Europeans: both one's residence and birthplace ranked here more significant than in the core countries and Scandinavia.

Since our respondents could not make sharp distinctions among the eight criteria as a whole, we attempted to uncover the relative differences with the help of a mathematical statistical procedure. In the shared space of the criteria offered the factor analysis brought three hidden dimensions to surface. The results are shown on fig. 7.

The first factor exhibits a response profile that excludes the criteria of religion and ethnic descent, while retaining all the other criteria as a whole without making distinctions among them. We see this pattern of thinking everywhere except in the Scandinavian region. The factors' values of the response profile that is sensitive to religion and descent vary widely across the regions. On the western and northern parts of Europe (including Great-Britain) no considerable role was attributed to religion and descent. In the Mediterranean and Central European countries religion and descent mattered but only showed a moderate significance for national identity. In contrast, Russians and Turks stressed religion and descent as key aspects of national identity. The pattern of categorization ascribing a strong role to political loyalty is predominantly a Western European feature not present in the Southern and Central regions of the continent. Particularly heavy emphasis is placed on the relationship between political loyalty and national identity in France, Norway, and Sweden. In these countries support for political loyalty exceeds 90 per cent.

⁷ Curiously, back in 1995 researchers entirely refused to include this category, led by theoretical considerations. They did not even approve our proposal to place a question about the role of ethnicity on the ISSP questionnaire. But in 2003 and 2013 "descent" was readily accepted among the category choices, which, to our surprise, proved relevant in every single country, albeit to various degrees. This might be explained by the prevalence of the political concept of nation in the academic perspectives; few believed that essentialist national ideas had disappeared from contemporary views.




Fig. 7. The Structure of National Categorization in Europe: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (average of factor scores)




Fig. 8. Support for the significance of the 8 criteria of national categorization in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (incidence of significant and highly significant choices, average of indices, max. value is 8)

We have examined how large or small was the group of criteria set up by our respondents for national identification. As we established earlier, exclusive national categorization implies that the group of preferred criteria is large, while an open and inclusive categorization signifies that the group of criteria required for national membership is small. The following table shows the varying occurrence of the closed (exclusive) concept of nationality measured by the support of exclusionary categories (eight of them altogether) in the different regions of Europe (fig. 8).

Our data clearly indicate that the two concepts of nationality apply differently to the European regions. Although the difference is relative, one can observe that in the "West" the exclusive idea of nationality is less prevalent. Respondents here set up the least narrow range of criteria for national categorization. In the Eastern countries, on the other hand, less inclusiveness was displayed, especially in Russia and Turkey.

Spontaneous national identity implies a division of the human world into an in-group and an out-group. The primordial ethnocentric pattern of positive identification with the in-group [27] resurfaces as national pride among the citizens of the modern nation state. Such pride can be occasioned by various aspects of reality constructed by national existence. Ten such aspects of reality were listed in our questionnaire; our subjects had to determine the degree to which each aspect induced national pride in their own country. The questionnaire featured the following themes: democracy, equality, international influence, economy, culture, the army, history, human rights, social welfare programs, and sport [26. P. 197-221].

The mathematical statistical analysis of the responses indicated a bifurcation of themes stimulating national pride (fig. 9): the first group featured themes like democracy, international influence, economy, social welfare programs, and the protection of minorities, all of which represent the values of modernity. The second group consisted of themes like science, sports, the arts, the army, and history. The themes of the first group rest on empirically verifiable facts. People whose pride is centered on them can therefore refer to facts to justify their pride. The themes of the second group, on the other hand, offer "data" that defy empirical grounding. National pride built on them usually relies on others' opinions and value judgments for support. Festinger [12. P. 259-291] has called this process societal comparison.

The figure below shows the typical themes evoking pride and the extent to which respondents identified with them.




Fig. 9. Ten sources of national pride in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

The trends are patently similar in the various regions. Pride in the nation is dominated by themes whose effectivity largely derives from societal comparison rather than empirically verifiable facts. The sources of these themes include historical accomplishments, cultural and scientific achievements and success in sports. We may also see that the themes linked to modernity's values and based on empirically verifiable facts (democracy, economy, political influence, welfare system, and minority rights) are treated very differently in the "West" and the "East": in Southern and Central Europe and Russia they are less likely to evoke pride while the trend is the opposite in the "West". Turkey is an exception, where themes related to modernization are quite popular – a fact reflective of the country's economic, political, and social welfare accomplishments over the past few decades.

Carrying out the analysis on the European countries' data bank, we see three prominent sets of themes (fig. 10) The first group's themes are relevant to national pride such as science, sports, the arts, the army, and national history. The second group's themes relate to classic modernization such as economic capacities and global political influence, and third group's themes are democracy, human rights and human welfare, all of which carry great significance in postmodern society.




Fig. 10. Symbolic-narrative, modernizing, and postmodern themes of national pride in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (average on a 100-point scale)

The more one moves toward the west, the more one finds modern and postmodern themes as sources of national pride. Citizens in the Eastern regions are less likely to consider such accomplishments as their own, with Turkey representing the only exception where modernizing values enjoy considerable support in the population. Besides the differences among the regions, variations within them in the "West" are noteworthy as well. In the three western regions, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland stand out with the highest level of pride in achievements in modernization; Denmark, Finland, France, and Great-Britain are quite a bit behind them. However as regards national pride in themes tied up with postmodern values, the prominent countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland. All the other countries appear less interested in them. The Irish seem the least concerned with their country's modern and postmodern achievements.

Yet our analysis intimates that pride evoked by conventional symbolic themes is present in every region in equal measure⁸. It is interesting to note that the post-Soviet societies of Russia and Central Europe produced vast achievements in quite a few areas during the quarter century following the regime changes. However, these results, apparently, did not register in people's perception.

A deficit in national self-esteem may have many reasons. First, while the former Soviet zone's countries made progress, so did the other European countries that had never been affected by Soviet hegemony, leaving the gap between them unchanged. Another reason may be that capitalism has produced few winners and too many losers. These losers, may not be enthused by the political and economic achievements of the post-communist era. For this group patriotic pride using symbolic, cultural, and traditional themes could serve as a time-honored means of deflecting tension built up through social frustration.

In Turkey, however, the recent decades have spawned an unparalleled economic upturn in tandem with the country's increasing political influence and broader social redistribution of wealth. This explains why the Turks' pride in modernization and traditional themes complement one another harmoniously. However, this contentment is not exempt from contradictions: National bias may have led the Turkish respondents to be proud of their democracy at a time – in 2013 – when the rise of a dictatorship and the persecution of the Kurd minority may have been evident.

to be continued

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⁸ Even though in every country the values measured for symbolic-narrative pride were high, the exceedingly high values of Great-Britain, Ireland and Iceland still surprised and intrigued us, providing yet another aspect to understanding the background and peculiar resources of the off-continent countries' national identity.

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НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ В ЕВРОПЕ (ЧАСТЬ I)

В статье описывается совокупность знаний о современной национальной идентичности, определяются различные элементы, такие как спонтанная национальная идентичность, опирающаяся на категоризацию, тематизацию, типизацию и релевантность, интерпретирующие структуры, позиции, символы, ценности, возможности и национальная идеология. Все эти элементы встроены в семантическую вселенную, созданную под названием «нация». В статье представлены эмпирические результаты, демонстрирующие различные варианты европейского национального опыта.

Ключевые слова: национальная идентичность, совокупность знаний, межнациональное сравнение, эмпирическое исследование.

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