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THE IRRESISTIBLE RISE OF POLITIAL NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND AND ITS ORIGINS

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The article will examine the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and, consequently, the history of Scottish nationalism in the 20th century. Established in 1934 the SNP has, in the last 50 years, moved from being a marginal conservative party to a social-democratic force which is both respected and feared, and which has defined and reshaped Scottish politics, brought the Scottish dimension at the centre stage and forced other political parties to respond in their terms. At the end of the Sixties, the party still had a rather vague political program which involved an independent Scotland within the British Commonwealth and, on the economic side, an "interclassist third way" between capitalism and socialism. During the 70's, the decline of heavy and shipbuilding industries and the closure of coal mines contributed to change social relations and political affiliations in Scotland. In this period, the SNP's politics was self-proclaimed as centre-left. With the entry into the party of an increasing number of workers (skilled and unskilled), students and members of the urban middle classes, the ideological orientation of Scottish nationalism underwent a left turn, while the party's stand on the issue of independence remained rather ambiguous. Certainly, both socialism and counter-culture had a limited impact in Scotland but, for a new generation of political activists, the Conservative and Labour parties had little to offer in the way of dynamism. The SNP recruited a new generation of activists (for instance, the so-called 79 Group) who were more in tune with some aspects of the counter-culture, while nationalism gained a new intellectual respectability with the leftist notion of anti-colonialism. In the 80's the Scottish nationalism began to become more comfortable asserting a full social democratic outlook. The party's identity became genuinely anchored to the centre-left, and the SNP replaced the Labor Party – more moderate and looking for a new center-oriented political location – in representing the interests of workers in Scotland. The paper aims to demonstrate the importance of economic factors in shaping political nationalism which, in the Scottish case, has seen the SNP increase the electoral support, undermine the territorial unity of the UK and become a true social democratic party able to challenge leftist political parties on ideological grounds.

Keywords: Scottish Nationalism; Scottish National Party; Nationalism and Socialism; Scotland; Nationalism and Labor; Centre-Periphery cleavage.
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Introduction

In 2018, the Scots should be asked once again to cast their vote on independence; it might turn out to be a groundbreaking historical event with far-reaching repercussions for the entire British and European political and administrative system[1].

At the forefront of the call for independence is the historic Scottish National Party (SNP) led by Nicola Sturgeon. On the strength of its electoral success in 2015, the SNP is calling for a complete break away from the authority of London[2], ever more so since the United Kingdom's planned withdrawal from the European Union. In March 2017, the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh approved plans to request a new referendum on independence that could take place just before Great Britain leaves the European Union, a process known as *Brexit*. The Scottish Parliament's vote set the stage for a constitutional tussle between London and the Scottish nationalists, and it epitomized the destabilizing consequences of Britain's divisive decision in June 2016 to withdraw from the European Union. In the *Brexit* referendum, 52 percent of voters chose to leave the EU, but Scotland voted – 62 percent to 38 percent – to remain; a vote that emphasizes a divergence between Scottish and English politics that poses an existential threat to the entire United Kingdom[3]. Thus the specter of nationalism is back once again to disturb the dreams of political observers, scholars and experts alike, in complete contradiction to the theories that posited nationalism, and its capacity for mobilization, as a throwback to a past era of European history. As Michael Keating [16. P. 204-218] points out, the disappearance of nationalism from the western political scene had been predicted for the first time at the end of

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[1] A referendum on Scottish independence was first held in September 2014, when 55.3 % voted against the proposal (http://scotlandreferendum.info).

[2] In the election for the Scottish Parliament, May 2011, the SNP obtained 45.4 % of the vote whilst in the United Kingdom general election of May 2015, the SNP obtained 50 % of the Scottish vote (The results are available on: http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results).

[3] In Northern Ireland, too, a majority (55,8 %) voted to remain in the European Union, amid fears that a withdrawal could weaken the peace process there (http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results).

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the Second World War, amidst the rubble of Nazi-fascist barbarism and then again at the end of the Cold War when the spread of international economic programs extended across the globe in an 'international wave of euphoria.' The course of events, however, seems to belie these predictions, as Scotland shows.

Nationalism in Scotland appeared to have reached its highest point with the 1970s electoral successes, after which it seemed that the failure of the 1979 referendum on the issue of devolution would put an end once and for all to proposals for a decentralized political-administrative system as well as for the deconstruction of the bipartisan political make up of Great Britain. At that time, the Scottish middle class, who had been seduced by the dream of nationalism, turned its back on the devolution project and voted soundly against it. But there was no adequate successive analysis of how the electorate had voted. In fact, the majority of 'yes' votes came from the working classes and the weaker social sphere, while the 'no' vote was expressed by the middle and upper classes. It was at this point – the moment of failure – that the SNP began a profound reflection about nationalism and about its own ideological underpinnings, and in the end, was able to avoid a process of involution and managed to reaffirm its presence on the political scenario over the next few years. A new policy, focusing on social-democratic values, and an expanded electorate (new supporters from the local working classes) radically modified the image and history of Scottish nationalism.

In order to understand the rise of the SNP and how it was able to pick up the popular vote, we need to review the pivotal moments of its past and pay particular attention to the ideological evolution that has characterized the last 40 years of the SNP's political history.

From the beginnings to the 1960s

Established in 1934 as a result of the union of the National Party of Scotland – a centre-left republican party which aimed at the political independence of Scotland – and the Scottish Party – a pro-devolution and conservative party – the Scottish National Party adopted a pragmatic platform that focused on obtaining more economic advantages for Scotland within Great Britain [18]. Its initial objective was to achieve the conditions necessary to create what could be thought of today as a region with special autonomous status. In the beginning, the new SNP platform was largely conservative: it condemned the policies of Labour, refused socialism outright (socialism was more widespread amongst the Scottish working classes at that time than in the rest of Great Britain), supported a brutal discriminatory campaign against Irish immigrants, and expelled high ranking republican exponents in the party [2. P. 104-128]. However, this platform, founded on the long history of the inability of the Scottish bourgeoisie to have a say in the British nation-building process, did not bring any electoral advantages to the party. Due to its own ambiguity within the political spectrum, a leadership that was unable to garner support, and the excessive heterogeneous nature of party members, the SNP lost its hold on the electorate.[4] The Scottish working classes continued to vote Labour and were attracted to their stand on social equality for the working masses, while the conservatives flocked to the Tories who best represented their interests. There was no change for the next decade: then came war.

At the end of the Second World War, Great Britain, like the majority of belligerent states, had to deal with the hardships of a dire economic and social crisis. Furthermore, the United Kingdom witnessed the disintegration of its vast colonial empire, which had been the political and ideological cornerstone of its history for centuries. The Labour government led by Clement Attlee sought to address the post-war economic challenges, and had the onerous task of nationalizing the state's energy resources, its services and transportation network and, affected within this programme, were Scotland's coal mining industry and electrical plants [9. P. 212-233]. However, kick starting the economy was not an easy task, and the conversion of heavy industry after the war was difficult and never really completed.

In those years, the SNP was not a significant player and remained on the margins of Scottish political life[5]. The party, with Robert McIntyre at the helm, had adopted an interclassist economic policy[6] while remaining internally divided into different factions: republicans, secessionists, gradualists, conservatives and

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[4] In the 1935 elections for the British Parliament, the SNP obtained 29.517 votes, or 1,3 % [12].

[5] In a decade, the SNP never managed to get more than 0,5% of the vote: in 1950 (0,4 %); 1951 (0,3 %); 1955 (0,5 %); 1959 (0,5 %).

[6] The SNP maintained this policy up to the end of the 1960s, as evidenced by a document published for the general elections in 1966: "We were tricked for whole generations by the Anglo- Unionist party propaganda and its spokesmen. Instead of asking us to put our country first, liberals, Tories and labour try to split us apart, asking to support their Anglo-Scottish anachronistic sectorial and classist interests. Voters, put Scotland first, vote SNP" [28. P. 4-5].

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liberals. In an area that was highly industrialized, working class sentiments were strong, and the lack of attention on the part of the new moderate leadership of James Halliday and Arthur Donaldson to the particular needs of the working classes meant that the nationalists did not make any significant inroads. The new leadership did not garner support – Donaldson was actually put in prison in 1941 because he was suspected of cultivating and maintaining relations with the Nazi secret services [34] – and they seemed to be completely incapable of offering a coherent social policy that could address Scotland's real exigencies. The SNP interclass model had consensus only in the heartland of Scotland, the small rural villages and towns, but did not win support either from the industrial proletariat, which remained loyal to the Labour Party, or from the large urban middle and upper classes who continued to vote for the Tories. Since the nationalists were incapable of keeping a foothold within the political spectrum, they were squashed between the two contending British parties. They did not offer an effective social policy to the electorate, and were divided internally between supporters for total independence and those who wanted some form of devolution. In 1960, after more than 20 years after its birth, the SNP was in the grips of a crisis, which seemed endemic, and there were very few people who believed it could survive the storm.

'*The Branches'*, the internal restructuring and first successes

At the beginning of the 1960s, the nationalist political platform still seemed to be rather vague. There was some sort of hypothesis for Scottish independence set within the British Commonwealth and a proposal for the elections of a Scottish parliament that would have an administrative role and would recognize the Queen as Head of State. In terms of economic policy, this new entity would be limited to soliciting transfer payments from London, asking for tax exemptions and investment capital for private businesses along the lines of the proposals of the social democrats of northern Europe, but the party did not present any clear cut ideological vision [6. P. 105-119]. The platform did not translate into electoral success as witnessed by the SNP's poor performance in the elections – no more than 5% of the vote over a 10 year period – and so the state of malaise within the party ranks continued to grow. In 1962 however, a slow process of internal restructuring and reorganization began thanks to pressure coming from the party base. The SNP adopted an extremely decentralized structure of '*branches*' (a local group with at least 20 members who could finance themselves) giving members more of a chance to participate in various activities and have a say in decision-making. The new strategy paid off – the number of branches increased from 18 in 1962 to 518 in 1971 [22. P. 78; 15. P. 99-103] – and the party gradually increased its own political leverage to the point that in 1970 306,802 Scots (11.4 %) voted for the SNP, which sent its first member to Parliament. For the first time, the Scottish nationalists had gathered popular support. On the strength of this result, during the leadership of William Wolfe (1969–1979), the SNP decided to propose its independence project – even if the republican solution still had support from a minority group within the party – and the nationalist agenda which was at first a folkloristic minority view began to gain credence as a viable solution. Even the party base was changing: the small bourgeoisie of the rural villages was now joined by increasing numbers of skilled and unskilled industrial workers who were disappointed with the inactivity of the labor movement in the face of an impending economic crisis[7]. The decline of key industries, the closure of the coalmines and the crisis of the Clyde shipbuilding industries, in fact, had hit the Labour Party's base and tarnished Labour's image; they appeared to be incapable of responding concretely to the swelling ranks of disgruntled workers. Labour's inability to address these issues and the deepening economic crisis, therefore, contributed to eroding the strong class bonds that had united the Scottish workers and the state institutions to the point that the workers were ready and willing to undertake dialogue with nationalist advocates. This was an important step towards an integration of the socio-economic issues of the industrial proletariat with the nationalist agenda. This became apparent during the assembly of the Scottish Trade Unions on February 14, 1972, which opened in a dramatically surreal atmosphere owing to the impending unemployment crisis and a heated debate over Great Britain's admission to the European Economic Union.[8] Two-thirds of the 1500 delegates who were present voted in favor of the motion, which was presented by the Association of Scottish National Trade Unionists that called for the immediate creation of a sovereign Scottish parliament and the possibility of negoti-

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[7] In a comparative analysis between data from Richard Mansbach [20. P. 188-189] and James Mitchell, Robert Johns and Lynn Bennie [24. P. 68-78] it can be estimated that 38 % of the SNP supporters came from the working class ranks from 1970–1982.

[8] Please see National Library of Scotland, Scottish Labour History Collection, Scottish Trades Union Congress, *Minutes and papers of trades councils affiliated to the Congress, 1948-1972*, Acc. 4683.

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ating separate trade agreements with other nation states [18]. This marked a complete change in strategy: the new strategy sought to unite the message of sovereignty to an autonomous trade unionist policy separate from London. Taking advantage of the referendum on Great Britain's entry into the EEC in 1975, the nationalists launched a nationwide boycott campaign. Actually, the EEC referendum question was only of marginal concern within the party's political agenda (unlike its clear opposition to the participation in NATO) since the party considered the EEC to be an antidemocratic centralizing body that was exclusively interested in taking care of the wellbeing of the old nation-states [29]. What offered real hope for national independence was, instead, the discovery of crude oil in the North Sea, off the coast of eastern Scotland, an issue that quickly became important for two reasons. On the one hand, the Scots could finally assert their objective of controlling and managing their own natural resources and, on the other, the debate itself touched off discussions on the inherent risks of forms of economic vindications deriving from future self-sufficiency. New members joined forming a faction that was younger and more dynamic, socialist in conviction, and they began to advance their point of view that it was necessary to nationalize the petroleum resources for a future independent Scotland. This could protect them from the claws of the American multinationals that were already in negotiations with British industrial cartels. As these young militants saw it, the profits from petroleum resources would be used to increase the level of funding for welfare programs in Scotland; according to this view, the control of the petroleum resources could guarantee a tangible improvement of the level of Scottish social wellbeing and could impact favorably on national health and education, as well as increase employment opportunities [30]. The campaign 'It's Scotland's Oil' inspired Wolfe to officially declare in 1974 that the SNP was in all respects a social-democratic party[9]. That message paid off: the SNP had resounding success at the polls in that election year, a result that had been unthinkable one year earlier. It obtained 839,617 votes (30.4 %) bringing 11 elected members to Parliament.

The call for independence, however, was not an issue that resonated deeply with Scottish voters, unlike other concerns such as environmental protection or the implementation of the welfare program, which struck a deeper chord. This seems to confirm the fact that the nationalist party policy gradually substituted the Labour Party as a legitimate representative of the interests of the industrial working classes as well as sectors of the lower and middle bourgeoisie who were battling the economic crisis of the 1970s. As James Mitchell has stated: 'class and national identity aligned in potent ways as never before' [23. P. 37]. In Scotland, as in the rest of the western world, the storm of student protest raged – certainly to a lesser extent than in other western states – and a new generation of activists (university students, young workers, and intellectuals) were attracted to nationalist sentiment; in turn, they added new lifeblood to the movement and a greater degree of intellectual credibility and respectability [11. P. 29; 10]. The radicalism of the younger generation and the diffusion of ideas, such as anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, had a great impact on the party causing tension between the new militants and the old guard. We must bear this context in mind in order to understand the events that unfolded in 1979.

The radical Scottish alternative to the Labour Party: the move to the Left and the years of consensus

The referendum on devolution proposed by the Labour government was held at the end of the complex 1970s[10]. The Referendum Act established that in order for it to be valid, 40 % of the electorate on the voting list had to vote. The 'yes' vote won in Scotland with a slight advantage (51.6 %), but the victory was deemed invalid because only 63.8 % of the voters expressed their vote representing only 32.9 % of the registered electorate, thus, not reaching the quorum established by the Referendum Act. In addition to this defeat was the fact that there was a considerable drop in voter turnout in the general elections in that year (from 30.4 % in 1974 to 17.3 % in 1979). The result of the referendum was, however, significant in that it acted as a catalyst in the political evolution of the process of modification of the strategy and the ideological underpinnings

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[9] In the manifesto for the elections to be held in October 1974 it is explained that: "[…] A Scottish government could control the petroleum industries so that they could guarantee the development of natural resources at the rate that is in Scotland's interests, and not those of London, the MEC or the United States. Production would be established at a level of 40–50 million tons a year, so that we may stockpile reserves of crude oil for generations to come. The income from petroleum drilling would be used to build homes, schools and hospitals, reduce unemployment in Scotland to the extent, less than 1 %, that exists in Norway, increase pension entitlements, give significant benefits to the sick and handicapped, and also, offer economic help to third world nations." [30].

[10] The referendum proposed the creation of a Scottish Parliament as well as a Welsh Parliament, issues concerning education, health, internal affairs, housing and culture [7; 4].

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of nationalism itself. Even if, on an official level, the SNP had stated in the past that it was not really concerned about the polarization of the political spectrum into left/right factions but was, instead, aspiring to represent the collective interests of the entire Scottish electorate till independence, the 1980s was marked by a significant increase within the party and in its nationalist faction of a leftist ideology. This faction, known as the 79 Group, had in its ranks some of the most knowledgeable militants of the party, like Roseanna Cunningham, Stephen Maxwell and Alex Salmond, who would go on to become future SNP leaders and the current Scottish Prime Minister. As mentioned previously, the party leadership was criticized after an in-depth analysis of the referendum results: the majority of 'yes' voters came from the Scottish working classes [1. P. 57]. This being the case, the SNP should have concentrated its efforts on the internal dynamics of Scottish society, and its message should have been based on three guiding principles: nationalism, socialism and republicanism [33. P. 163]. In other words, only if the SNP became a radical alternative to the Labour Party, could nationalism triumph in Scotland.

The contrast and debate between the old guard of the party, who still dreamt of the transformation of the movement into a moderate 'community party', and the younger generation of activists, who were leftist oriented, became more and more heated. The 79 Group released its own publication (SNP 79 Group Papers), which focused on the need for the party to direct its policy towards the left: 'the SNP must look towards the urban working classes to establish itself as the radical Scottish alternative to the Labour Party' [21. P. 22]. Tensions between the party factions grew even further when a few representatives of the 79 Group barged into the Royal High School of Edinburgh in October 1981. Although an embarrassment to the nationalist leadership, the protest was part of a new 'civil disobedience' campaign that had been thought up and executed by the leftist faction of the party but was frowned upon by the gradualist faction and the old guard militants who believed all actions had to be legal [17. P. 103]. In this climate fraught with tension, the party surprisingly decided to create a group who would make contact with the Provisional Sinn Fein[11] – a decision that was in complete violation of the leadership directives and right at the time when '*the troubles*' in Northern Ireland had reached their most violent *nadir*. The party leadership believed that the young socialists had gone too far and so on September 20, 1982, Gordon Wilson, the new party leader, and the leadership, expelled seven members of the 79 Group. Even though Wilson was opposed to their radical bent and tired of the constant bickering between internal factions, he was, however, convinced that the party needed to go towards social democracy[12]. At the end of 1986, almost all of the members who had been expelled (for example Salmond) were readmitted in the ranks of the SNP in the knowledge that, despite disagreements and continuing ambiguities, the party would have to give due importance to social issues and trade union demands. With the party's decision to lean towards the left, signaling a direct attack on Thatcherism, and its determined opposition to nuclear arms, nationalist conduct became far more audacious in the mid-80s. The party began campaigns aimed at the elimination of racism and anti-colonialism, pushed for Scotland to pull out of NATO (1986), and supported solidarity campaigns for the Sandinista government in Nicaragua [22. P. 175]. Even so, the true turning point for the party was its adoption of a new socio-economic strategy. Within the context of real economic hardship and marked by ever increasing unemployment rates[13], the nationalists supported the miners' strike (1984–85), thus stepping in where the Labour Party was stepping out, looking for a new center-oriented political position. In the 1980s, the battle for independence had become essentially subordinate to socio-economic issues, as had the proposal of administrative decentralization that had become subordinate to the party's need to soften the anti-European position that had characterized the party in preceding years.[14] By embracing these new policies and by defending workers rights and needs, the SNP found the key for its nationalist success in Scotland and was no longer relegated to the backbenches of political marginality as it had been in the past.

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[11] The political branch of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The party, separatist and socialist, took on the name Provisional Sinn Féin in January 1970 after an internal split between the Irish republican movement, the armed wing of the movement (*Provisional*) and the faction that favoured a gradual abandonment of the armed struggle (*Official*).

[12] On that occasion, Stephen Maxwell, Chris Cunningham, Douglas Robertson, Alex Salmond, Brenda Carson, Kenny MacAskill e Andrew Doig were expelled [33. P. 171].

[13] In Scotland, the unemployment rate had risen from 3,6 % in 1974 to 14 % in 1984 [3. P. 24-37].

[14] In the manifesto for the general elections in 1987, for the first time, the SNP proposed its possible adhesion to the European Community as an independent member state. This position could have guaranteed the opportunity to effectively contribute to European affairs and at the same time, protect particular national Scottish interests such as the fisheries industry, naval shipbuilding and agriculture [31. P. 9].

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Conclusions

Although the SNP did not change into a radical leftist movement as hoped for by the 79 Group – republicanism as well as socialism were excluded from the Party's political agenda – it adopted, however, a social-democratic model and became much more active in the support of trade unions, thus filling the space on the left relinquished by the Labour Party. With its opposition to the Poll Tax[15] at the beginning of the 90s, the SNP definitively became the accredited antagonists of the Labour Party, irretrievably seduced by neoliberalism.

Alex Salmond, who had set aside his youthful radicalism, became leader of the party in 1990 and was convinced that the SNP should become a modern progressive movement attracting the majority of Scottish voters. Thanks to Salmond's leadership and very quickly, the independence question leapt to the forefront of political discourse with unstoppable fervor. His strategy was, and still is, based on a gradual approach to devolution (approved by the historic 1998 referendum), as well as the creation of the Scottish Parliament, as the first steps towards full sovereignty. Salmond has brought in a new generation of leaders and managers who had all come up through the socialist ranks; they proposed innovative ideas beneficial to welfare, renewable energy sources, civil rights and a radically new nationalist *rapprochement* with Europe.[16] The SNP outflanked Labour and eroded its primacy in Scottish political life: the electoral growth of the SNP in the 90s can be attributed, in part, to the growing numbers of former Labour supporters [5. P. 55-67; 26. P. 146-148].

Of the utmost importance, however, was the socio-economic policy that was and still is fundamental to the history of nationalism in a non-state nation [14; 25]. In light of this, it is understandable why nationalism in Scotland, operating within a context characterized by the swelling ranks of well-organized trade unionists, gradually moved towards the left of its own political axis between 1968 and 1988. The SNP succeeded in becoming the first real rival to the traditional representatives of the working classes (the Labour Party), taking from Labour its claims and ideology and then presenting itself as the only party capable of facing the new economic crisis, focusing on a program halfway between the "liberal social democracy" of New Labour and some of the policies of the New Left, like income redistribution, the development of renewable energies, the protection of civil rights and anti-racism.[17] The SNP transformed itself into a political force for the masses and the independence issue gained respectability and credence. The ultimate consequences of this process are difficult to predict, especially after the *Brexit* vote and Britain's decision to withdraw from the European Union. It can be said with certainty, however, that the future of Great Britain appears to be quite uncertain today. Could it really be the end of the 'United' Kingdom?

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[15] In reality, it was a tax on each person for a sum that was established by the local authorities, and introduced in Scotland by the Conservative government in 1989.

[16] Scottish independence within the European Community was described by the new leadership as "the only policy that will bring stability and prosperity to Scotland." [32. P. 2].

[17] In 2007, the first elected representative from a minority group to enter the Parliament in Edinburgh was the Indian Bashir Ahmad of the Scottish National Party [19. P. 44].

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НЕОБРАТИМЫЙ РОСТ И ИСТОКИ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО НАЦИОНАЛИЗМА В ШОТЛАНДИИ

В статье исследуется рост популярности Шотландской национальной партии (ШНП) и, соответственно, история шотландского национализма в XX веке. Созданная в 1934 году, Шотландская национальная партия прошла за последние 50 лет путь от маргинальной консервативной партии до социал-демократической, к которой одновременно относятся и с уважением, и с опасением. Партия во многом определила и изменила шотландскую политику, привнесла шотландское измерение в центр политического внимания и заставила другие партии реагировать на ее действия. В конце 1960-х годов у партии была расплывчатая политическая программа, которая рассматривала независимость Шотландии в рамках Британского Содружества Наций, а в экономической сфере делала ставку на «межклассовый третий путь» развития, что-то среднее между капитализмом и социализмом. В 70-е годы, в период кризиса в тяжелой промышленности, судостроительной отрасли, в период закрытия уголь-

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ных шахт происходят изменения в социальных отношениях и политических предпочтениях в Шотландии. В этот период ШНП провозгласила себя лево-центристской партией. С вступлением в партию все большего числа рабочих (квалифицированных и неквалифицированных), студентов и представителей городских средних слоев идеология шотландского национализма стала эволюционировать влево, а позиция партии по вопросу о независимости оставалась довольно противоречивой. В целом, как идеи социализма, так и контркультура имели ограниченное влияние в Шотландии, но для нового поколения политических активистов традиционные консервативные и лейбористские подходы не обладали достаточным динамизмом. ШНП привлекла новое поколение активистов (например, так называемая группа 79), которые были в большей степени настроены воспринять некоторые идеи контркультуры, в то время как национализм приобрел новую интеллектуальную респектабельность, взяв на вооружение левые идеи антиколониализма. В 1980-е годы шотландский национализм практически полностью воспринял социал-демократическое мировоззрение. Партия четко ассоциировала себя с лево-центризмом, ШНП заменила Лейбористскую партию, которая занимает более умеренную позицию, продолжает искать свое политическое место и претендует на роль выразителя интересов рабочего класса Шотландии. Целью статьи является продемонстрировать важность экономических факторов в формировании политического национализма, который, в шотландском случае, представлен в деятельности ШНП. Именно эта партия увеличивает электоральную поддержку, подрывает территориальное единство Великобритании и становится настоящей социал-демократической партией. ШНП способна бросить вызов левым партиям в идеологической сфере.

Ключевые слова: шотландский национализм; шотландская национальная партия; национализм и социализм; Шотландия; национализм и труд; отношения между центром и периферией.

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