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*M.V. Chernyshev***THE CONCEPT OF ATLANTICISM IN TIME PERSPECTIVE:
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND MODERN INTERPRETATIONS**

Strategic partnership between EU Member States and the United States is one of the central issues in the subject of international relations. The majority of agreements reached as part of EU-US bilateral relations concern trade and foreign policy issues. The realisation of policy initiatives in these fields to the large extent depends on adherence to Atlanticism as a sort of quasi-ideology which implies support for rapprochement between Europe and America. In common mind the power gap between the two strategic actors which represent to Western civilisation, the US and the EU, seems to be the consequence of numerous factors, including their military capabilities, political motivations, regional priorities, different threat perceptions, and security strategies. On the other hand, one needs to explain whether public support for transatlantic partnership is genuinely based on shared values and long-term interests or is contingent and conditional on short-term personal factors (attitude to American presidents), political opportunities and pressures (reaction to certain initiatives of the American administration in doing foreign policy).

In this essay the term Atlanticism is used as identified by Graeger and Haugevik (2009) to denote a specific type of policy identity and orientation, anchored in geographical location, historical ties with the US and a wary attitude to European integration. Approaches of several international relations theories related to analysis of the concept of Atlanticism have been reviewed. One of them, grounded in a rationalist style of reasoning, is applicable to see the strategic choices of states as structurally determined. Their long-term interests are exogenously given – meaning that they can largely be explained with reference to external structures such as geopolitics, great-power politics and spheres of interest. While such an approach to studying foreign policy orientations can be fruitful in many cases, it is less so in the context of a more profound research, where the purpose is precisely to trace changes in the seemingly deep-seated Atlanticist identities of European countries such as the UK and Italy or on the contrary, in the countries with strong historical tradition of anti-Americanism like France. Nevertheless, despite the formation of the concept of “new Atlanticism” in the last decade, an evident coherence with the established intellectual tradition existing since the late 19th century can be observed.

Keywords: Atlanticism, Atlantic community, Atlantic Union, Western civilisation, Lippmann, Streit, NATO’s enlargement, American foreign policy, international relations, liberal institutionalism, peace theory, realism, constructivism.

«Two very different views of history are competing for the soul of Europe. For one, Europe has now the chance to move beyond the interlude of US domination after 1945 and return to a specifically European course. For the other, the outcome of the two world wars and the subsequent decades of globalisation have created a new situation in which Europe’s fate, as a matter of fact, is going to rise or sink in parallel to that of the US and other major powers, underlining Europe’s interest to work with these partners in an active, global role».

Becher, K. It Takes an Optimist: The Future Role of NATO in European Security. The speech given at the conference «New Europe, old Europe and the new transatlantic agenda» in Warsaw in 2003.

Introduction

Atlanticism as an ideological orientation of policy makers has become a factor contributing to promotion of transatlantic partnership since the late 19th century. According to the very basic definition, it is a doctrine of cooperation among western European and North American nations regarding political, economic, and defense issues, with the purpose to maintain the security of the participating countries, and to protect the values that unite them, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law [1]. In the late 1980s, Robert Keohane argued that Atlanticism had become analogous to a convention, a category that comprised informal institutions with implicit rules and understandings that shape the expectations of actors and coordinated their behavior [2]. Later this view evolved to characterisation of Atlanticists as those on both sides of the Atlantic, who believed that the viable solution to the problems of international instability and war was to induce the democratic nations to team up and become the nucleus of world order, the underpinning and supplement for the weaker universal system, and the engine of reform for the rest of the world in the direction of greater political and economic freedom.

During the post-Cold War period public expectations projected into designing several reforms regarding the mechanisms of improving cooperation between Europe and North America included creation of the

Transatlantic Political Council for the purpose of systematic high-level consultation and coordination in respect of foreign and security policy, formation of a unified transatlantic market by 2015, and formation of transatlantic assembly which could replace the current Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue. Despite the existence of longitudinal debates over these issues and feasibility of their implementation, the role of general orientations toward transatlantic partnership in Europe should not be neglected.

Origins of the idea

The contemporary idea of deep British-American interdependence dates back to the late 19th century. Early Atlanticism, as Teus Lebbink named it, assumed not merely development of economic cooperation and installment of specific libertarian institutions but also «implantation of the democratic social ideas so unique in the world» among other nations [3. P. 28]. After the decision by the US government to enter the World War I in April 1917 on the side of Great Britain and France, the recognition of the Atlantic ties (and more specifically, British-American connection) became a new trend in US foreign policy. The concept of «Atlantic Community» was developed by American journalist Walter Lippmann who elaborated it during World War I and explained as a necessity to pool the resources of the British and American democracies in the struggle against authoritarian nationalisms to create the conditions for the eventual establishment of a liberal world order. Being under impression of Germany's threat to British naval supremacy Lippmann argued that «the safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight because on the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean there has grown a profound web of interests which joins together the Western world» [4].

Thirty years later, in his book *The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy* written in 1947, Lippmann spoke more precisely about the members of the desired community:

The natural allies of the United States are the nations of the Atlantic community: that is to say, the nations of Western Europe and of the Americas. The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, which is the arm of the Atlantic Ocean, unite them in a common strategic, economic and cultural system [5. P. 17-18].

According to the author, the principal components of the Atlantic community were the British Commonwealth of nations, the Latin states on both sides of the Atlantic, the so-called «low countries» such as Switzerland and Scandinavian nations, and the United States. The boundaries of the Atlantic community did not seem to be sharp and distinct, particularly in the case of the Germans and the western Slavs and the dependencies and the colonies of Western Europe.

The nucleus of the Atlantic community remained distinct and unmistakable, and among the nations that were indisputably members of the community there existed a vital connection based on their military and political geography, the common traditions of Western Christendom, and their economic, political, legal, and moral institutions which, with all their variations and differences, have a common origin and have been shaped by much of the same historic experience [6].

Thus, Lippmann crafted a conceptual framework for promoting American internationalism that blended political realism, cosmopolitanism, and classical diplomacy. The Atlantic Ocean was no longer considered a barrier but a connection between the two continents.

In the interwar period Atlanticism received political backing from the US President Woodrow Wilson (1913–21) whose approach of achieving world order was through reliance entirely on universal institutions such as the United Nations. In the 1930s, an American journalist Clarence Streit systematized two-tiered conceptualisation of Atlanticism that had already been developing for a few decades by that time. In 1939, when the most urgent problem was to prevent the worldwide spread of German military aggression, Streit in the book *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic* advocated «federal union» among the North Atlantic democracies. The so-called «mature democracies» and economically most developed countries – the first tier, consisting primarily of the Atlantic nations – pooled their resources to assure the maintenance of peace and order at the global level. This could favor a long-term evolution of the less developed nations – the second tier – to converge with the first [7]. The author's clear proposal did not stop with the initial creation of an Atlantic union but conceived it as a small group of indispensable nations which could have a deep effect on others and eventually embrace all mankind. Later this goal was stressed out in the Atlantic Charter devised in August 1941 by British prime-minister Winston Churchill and American president Franklin Roosevelt. The realisation of the permanent military integration which emerged with the start of the Cold War as NATO, made the idea of an unified Atlantic community the matter of practical policy.

Discussions over the concept in the post-Cold War period

After the end of the Cold war numerous authors further specified the concept of Atlanticism. In order to make it sound more metaphysical, a member of the Federal Union committee John Williams (1997) referred to Atlanticist theology. «Like all theologies», he pointed out, «the theology of Atlanticism is based on a myth, namely, that the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of Europe and America are inseparable in the final analysis» [8]. Zielonka (1998) noted that comprehensive transatlantic cooperation «rests on solid economic and political trestles, not just on increasingly weak strategic ones» [9. P. 171]. The struggle against global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation deepened unity among Western industrial democracies and facilitated the integration of Eastern European countries into the Atlantic camp, along with compounded cooperation across the other «concentric circles». Hodge (2004) defines Atlanticism as the «common heritage and a shared destiny» of all the states bordering the North Atlantic» [10. P. 2]. To follow this perspective some theories developed in the earlier period were adapted for the new reality.

In this historical review of the concept of Atlanticism theories originated in the field of geopolitics are worth mentioning. In one of his major books *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919) Halford Mackinder presented his theory of the Heartland (named also «the geographic pivot of history») based on theoretical analysis of geopolitical factors which later contradicted political idealism of US President Woodrow Wilson. One of the most famous quotes from the book was: «Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the World» [11. P. 23]. Atlantic people had to «penetrate» the threatening Heartland, «shaping political life in the direction of nationalities» [11. P. 203-204]. Referring to these ideas, Ionel Sava (2004) used the concept of thalassocratia (sea-thinking) to describe Atlanticist mindset. In the author's viewpoint, the latter is based on the primacy of the individual, economic liberalism, protestant democracy and urban life as opposed to the continental perspective which means hierarchy, communitarism, authoritarianism and rural life reflected in the «Eastern» order. Sava forms his argument on the idea that the ancient Greek diasporas in the Mediterranean passed thalassocratic thinking to the mediaeval city-states of Venice and Genoa which later handed it on to the people of the North, particularly to the Anglo-Saxons [12].

Since there are numerous debates whether it is possible to define Europe as an autonomous geopolitical entity, the core question of Euro-Atlanticism remains about the expanding sea power which is identified with the US Christopher Layne (2003) calls this geopolitical equilibrium offshore balancing assuming establishment of American hegemony on the mainland through a sea-power strategy. The «Atlantic Europe» appears to be an American geopolitical platform while Euro-Asia can be potentially seen as a German (EU) – Russian conglomerate. After the end of the Cold War, with several waves of NATO enlargement and the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, one could notice the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic civilisation, based on sea-power, with all of its economic (market), political (democracy), ideological (freedom) and technological (Internet) dimensions. In the 21st century, the Heartland is geographically seen as «Eurasian», but geopolitically it is Euro-Atlantic dominated, while the sea-power has reached the heart of the land-power [13, P. 13]. Graeger and Haugevik (2009) argue in favor of existence of three main aspects (sublayers) of Atlanticism: a geographical location bordering the Atlantic Ocean, historically close ties with the United States (bilaterally and through NATO) and a cautious approach to European integration [14].

Ira Straus (2005) states that historically Atlanticism positioned itself as a way to combine the two forms of power, hard and soft, and the two forms of action, national and collective. At the same time, it tends to overcome a number of other antinomies that stood in the way of cumulative success in international relations – the divide between peace politics and power politics, between pacifism and patriotism, idealism – realism, freedom – union, nationalism – internationalism, regionalism – universalism [15].

The way of presenting the US and the EU as two edges of a single security community was introduced by constructivist scholars Adler and Barnett (1998) on the basis of the concept modeled by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. The authors specified it by shared identities, values and meaning, many-sided direct interactions, and reciprocal long-term interest. Security communities appeared to be clusters of states «glued together» by a notion of shared history, perceptions, values and destiny [16]. In accordance with these views, professor Charles Kupchan from Georgetown University and at that time an official in the administration of President Clinton (1998) reasoned that within Atlanticism it made sense to speak of a Western community precisely because the Atlantic democracies share a political space grounded in common identity. American and European leaders were seeking to breathe a new life into the Atlantic community and binding together the democracies of both continents by deepening and broadening the institutions that served the Atlantic community so

well during the Cold War. The solution to the West's dilemmas in this respect was an Atlantic union (AU) that should subsume the EU and NATO:

Bold leadership in laying out a vision of a peaceful, prosperous union of Atlantic democracies and proceeding with the necessary institutional innovations will suffice to wean citizens away from domestic preoccupations and inspire them to construct a new West. States joining the AU would take on three basic commitments: to introduce a single market, to uphold collective security, and to expand political engagement at the transnational level [17. P. 131].

In accordance with the latter argument, Europe must continue to focus on binding its power and exercising it in partnership with the US rather than seeking to aggregate its power and project it externally. Under these preconditions the EU would not have the luxury of acting as an off-shore balancer. Thus, although projecting common with the US transatlantic identity takes place within a particular interpretative optic, the EU needs it for the purpose of completion of its values and interests. Possible divergences between the EU and the US and their respective policies can be understood due to consideration of differences in goals and social identities of Americans and Europeans. Nevertheless, spreading of Western values and transatlantic solidarity on the basis of changing norms and institutions opens the way to intensification of the transatlantic dialogue.

The assumptions of liberal institutionalism and Peace Theory are based on the idea that the US and the EU are stable, enduring, liberal democracies with market economies, engaged in a high level of transatlantic trade and investment, fostering «a newly christened liberal security institution, NATO» [18. P. 160]. Thus, the US faces and would face no balancing behavior from Europe because like the United States, it is a liberal society headed by leaders who all share liberal values. Overwhelming US power does not threaten the core values of European partners, and these states do not fear it. More broadly, idealists have presented the Atlantic Ocean as «an inland sea of Western Civilisation» and as the heir of the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions [19. P. 12]. When Karen Smith (2001) emphasizes the role of «Western project to encourage democracy», she notes that «this term implies a collective strategy, thus far not articulated, and more coordination among the actors than has actually been the case» [20. P. 31]. She associates the impact of Western objectives with multilateral organisations such as NATO, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe.

The notion of the «free world» to describe Atlanticist community was reintroduced by Garton Ash (2004) in his book *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West* [21], although the idea of a new mission was presented earlier by Lindberg (2004) who argued in favor of this collective subject to push outward not only addressing security threats such as terrorist-harboring states or potentially destabilizing refugee flows but also acting out of a shared sense of what constitutes progress and the desirability of pursuing it: political, social, and economic. He remarks:

In no serious case do we think of each other as entirely «other», that is, as outsiders who may constitute a willful threat, and that is why Europe and America can and should still be called «we» [22].

Moreover, Lindberg argues that even if there are disagreements, «disgust actually presupposes a sense of commonality or community». This community is based on its historical roots and essentially has democratic, liberal and bourgeois values. Being unique it has formed «the largest, most robustly developed transnational ethical community in the world today» [22]. For Garton Ash (2004) the free world is a synonym for the West and freedom defines the programme or mission of the West to spread it: «Freedom is not just for us but for all» [21. P. 219].

Taking a step back from considering the impact of political leadership on developing of political strategy in the US and the EU, it is important to quote Henry Kissinger (1965) who noted that «what the West means to others depends... on what it means to itself», with the answer lying in its own visions of the future [23. P. 249-51]. He also emphasised that «the West today is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance» [23. P. 248]. Similarly, he argued that the origin of the problem in transatlantic dialogue lay in Europe's growing self-esteem and self-confidence that was based on strengthening European integration, a process supported and even initiated by America.

In interpretation of the realist school of thought the West is seen as a union of primarily Europe and the US to preserve their common interests in competition with other geopolitical actors. As Ikenberry (2008) notes, several decades ago the US engineered a successful *intra-western postwar bargain*: namely, the construction of an American-led order, based around security and economic institutions, in return for allowing its power to be tied down in organisational frameworks. This American-inspired order was not imposed on the Europeans but was negotiated with them to provide it with constituent characteristics [24]. Lundestad (2008) characterized this policy as «empire by integration» [25] and Cox (2005) «empire by consent» [26].

The reasoning of these authors followed the idea that international bargains were negotiated when the US helped to guarantee the security of countries in return for their membership in an American-led alliance and the provision of bases for US forces.

After the 9/11 public attention began to switch to a new security agenda – combating against international organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and global terrorism. Nevertheless, the realpolitik of American presidential administration at the time of George W. Bush's presidency caused fears among Europeans that they would be dominated by the overwhelming power of the US. A palpable sense became widespread that major questions on the future of international politics no longer involve them. European opinions and preferences did not seem to matter, as the United States appeared determined to define its interests nationally, assertively, and unilaterally. Thus, the transition from specific reciprocity at the time of Cold War, where trust existed on a *quid pro quo* basis, to indirect and generalized reciprocity of the new century appeared to be problematic to achieve. This observation was substantiated by Barry Buzan (2008) who stated:

In the absence of any great power challenger, the US has pursued an increasingly imperial and militarized foreign policy and continued to engage in «unnecessary wars». It has projected a rhetoric and practice of sovereigntism and unilateralism and celebration of its own power, particularly military power, the effect of which has been increasingly to unravel the self-binding of earlier decades and to undermine the loyalty of the US's followers, particularly, but not only, in Western Europe [...] While the US might retain the desire, and up to a point the material capacity to lead, it is likely to find itself increasingly without followers [27].

In interpretations of the Realist school the source of the transatlantic crisis is generally seen in disagreements over core security interests between states as political actors, while the impact of personalities on foreign policy making is not crucially important. Lehti (2010) argues that although the rhetoric on the existence of fundamental differences between Europe and the US actually originated at the beginning of the colonisation of North America, such claims did not challenge the existence of the West before the post-Second World War era, when the Atlantic connection began to symbolize the core axis of the West [28, P. 94]. After 1945 the transatlantic relationship became dependent on certain issues in foreign affairs from disagreements over German rearmament and the Suez crisis in the early 1950s, to the Gaullist challenge in the 1960s and various other disputes in the 1970s and 1980s. Stephen Walt (1998) argues that «for the past forty years, the partnership between Europe and the United States was held together by three unifying forces»: Soviet threat as a first and most important factor, America's economic stake in Europe, which reinforced its strategic interest in European prosperity and the existence of a generation of European and American elites whose personal backgrounds and life experiences left them strongly committed to the idea of an Atlantic community. The author notes that all three unifying forces «are now gone or eroding, and there is little hope of resurrecting them» [29, P. 3]. The global West, hence, has been fractioning. In this regard, Donald Puchala (2005) noted that a «legacy of shared Western values» could not hide the fact that domestic politics are eroding «sentimental ties» and thus the transatlantic security community [30].

In his book written at the time of the start of the war in Iraq *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (2003) Robert Kagan presented fairly simplistic metaphors “Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus” which became widely discussed during the first major post-Cold War transatlantic dispute surrounding the beginning of the war in Iraq [31]. In his article written in the same year *The end of Atlanticism* Ivo Daalder also expressed rather pessimistic concern about the future of transatlantic relations. He pointed at the fact of serious trouble in the relations soon after the start of the Iraq war and noted that for the first time after the end of the Cold War a new basis for the relationship must have been found, mostly due to the changing structure of relations between the United States and Europe. The important focus of European foreign policy was oriented toward eliminating the possibility of a return to internal conflict through an ever greater commitment to sharing sovereignty within a European Union. So while America's focus shifted away from Europe, Europe's focus shifted ever more inward. In contrast to the unilateralist approach taken by the US administration Europeans favored what was termed a «globalist» foreign policy, one that relies on international cooperation as a means to deal with the multiple challenges and opportunities globalisation creates [32, P. 152]. Moreover, prevailing focus in Europe on so-called post-industrial issues changed Europeans' attitudes to America. For some observers, a deep split is now evident over such issues as the death penalty, the imprisonment of minors, gun ownership and violent crime [32; 28]. That could lead to political desire of European politicians to reconstruct notions of identity from the prevailing identity of the transatlantic community and instead to define identity in separate European and American terms [33, P. 9].

Types of Atlanticism in Europe

Consideration of strategic cultures of certain European countries can be seen in terms of coherent and lasting sets of ideas about transatlantic partnership, specific to a given socio-historical context, also on the use of armed force and the role of the military institutions. Soon after the start of the Iraq war, despite the rhetoric on unified Europe and its common pursuit of foreign policy objectives with the US, several centers of forces appeared within the EU. In a study of EU member-states' positions on the Iraq war, Menon and Lipkin (2003) identified three different types of Atlanticism in Europe. *Traditional Atlanticists* have stable, long-term relations with the NATO and the US. Britain, Portugal and Denmark were cited as examples. Some of the Western European countries that in the first decade of the 21st century were seen as having an Atlanticist orientation had long-standing, bilateral relationships with the United States that had originated in imperial relations (Britain) or in immigration to North America in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Italy). *Conjunctive Atlanticists* are less predictable in their preference for the United States and NATO. The authors placed Spain and Italy in this group.

Finally, *reflex Atlanticists* do not have a tradition of putting the US and NATO at the center of their security policy, but because of their (communist) pasts they tend to side with the United States. The main examples include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary [34]. Following this logic, NATO's enlargement in 2004 and 2009 could yield nine more countries as potential candidates to the list of reflex Atlanticists [14. P. 13]. With the enlargement of NATO to include Eastern and Central European states, the emergence of more NGO and Atlanticist clubs is possible, and that might challenge the force of solidarity within the EU. In regard to this process, Hynek and Stritecky (2009) differentiate between the ardent geopolitical Atlanticism and strategic Atlanticism as dominant geopolitical discourses in Poland and the Czech Republic. In both latter cases political elites tried to strengthen relations with the US and attempted to reinforce their position in Europe but considered different level of contributions in terms of military and diplomatic backing toward Washington at the time of international crises [35].

Different types of Atlanticist orientations are likely to remain enduring and critical variables in the future. But, firstly, despite general inclination of people and politicians in European countries toward cooperation with the US after the end of the Cold War a substantial difference in public views on transatlantic partnership exists there, specifically after 2003. Besides, it seems a logical mistake to assume historical inclination towards keeping transatlantic ties strong to be permanent since historical memories fade and political elites turn over and retire. New events lead to readjustment of public views in all European countries on transatlantic partnership. As an example, the gratuitous unilateralism that marked the whole period of George W. Bush presidency had a profoundly negative impact on European elites and public opinion (public opinion data from Eurobarometers and Transatlantic Trends project can confirm this observation). On the other hand, the more recent trend in European-American relations which became evident after the 2008 US presidential elections led to formation of the concept of *new Atlanticism* (also young or revived Atlanticism) as opposed to *traditional Atlanticism*. In March 2010, European Commission President Jos Manuel Barroso officially called for a more dynamic transatlantic relationship «based on results rather than process».

Recent trends

Substantial shifts in the US in terms of demographic and social development over the last decades created substantial obstacles for transatlantic partnership which matter especially in the long run. Dunn (2009) pointed out that America was becoming much more diverse in its country of origin and ethnic composition. While by the first term of Barack Obama presidency 72 per cent of the US population was white, that proportion is expected to decline to 62.4 per cent by 2025, with the remaining populace composed of 17.6 per cent Hispanic, 13 per cent black, 6.2 per cent Asian and 0.8 per cent American Indians. By 2030 the non-Hispanic white population will make up less than half the people under the age of 18, but three quarters of those over 65. It is expected that by 2042 the US will no longer have a majority consisting of white population [33. P. 9].

The unusual length of the 2008 American presidential campaign and focus on global issues associated with it allows one to trace public concerns of Europeans at that time. Obama was clearly not the only candidate who accentuated the necessity to change the style of American foreign policy. But despite the emphasis on the need for changes of the previous state policies implemented by George W. Bush the two Democratic and one Republican candidates running for the Presidency did not reject the idea of US global leadership.

However, Senator Barack Obama seemed to fit largely a liberal internationalist approach. According to Stephen J. Randall (2009), the name Obama meant change: «an Obama presidency, if it remains true to its promise, is certainly destined to provide a more humane, balanced, multilateral, consultative and diplomatic approach to foreign policy than the nation has experienced over the past eight years» [36. P. 22]. Obama repeatedly talked about how the US could be «more effective» if the state returned to «working with our friends». He expressed his commitment to the use of diplomacy as the first option by means of building partnerships for addressing both security and non-security issues globally but also did not abandon completely the tenets of the Bush doctrine. A few years later several authors pointed out that Obama's foreign policy repeatedly manifested a combination of the realist's pragmatic approach to the world and the idealist's progressive approach to a new world order that he was seeking to shape. He was, in that sense, a hybrid president: a progressive pragmatist. The primary goal was to form a new, multilateral global order with America still in the head, especially in matters of hard power, but sharing more responsibilities and more burdens with others where possible or necessary [38. P. 374].

The further revision of the forms of solidarity between Europe and America took place during the second term of Obama presidency. As Richard Sakwa (2015) put it, the increasingly hermetic and comprehensive character of the Atlantic community became at odds with visions of a more plural and inclusive Europe [39]. After several unsuccessful attempts to «reload» partnership with Russia the latter was accused of determining the strategic choices of its neighbors, notably Georgia and Ukraine, to join a political-military alliance of NATO. The revived concept of new Atlanticism appeared to be the ideological manifestation of consolidation within the alliance in order to put pressure on Russia and other potentially aggressive states as it seemed from the Western perspective. It was accompanied by the efforts to bring NATO to Russia's borders and by the continued pre-eminence of Washington in the alliance system. From a defensive coalition of states established to resist the Soviet Union, the new Atlanticism even rhetorically demonstrated itself as more militant in advancing its interests and more culturally aggressive, setting itself up as a model of civilisational achievement. Being unable to accept geopolitical pluralism in Europe, it thus has become an increasingly monistic in ideology and practical foreign policy implications. Another, more practical implication visible after preparation for the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which was to have been signed in Vilnius on 28–29 November 2013, but which in the end was signed only in May 2014 after the overthrow of the Victor Yanukovich administration, testified to the growing «transdemocratic» linkage between security and political matters. At the same time, the new Atlantic community tends to be reinforced by efforts to give greater institutional form to economic links. The idea of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has recently been given a new impulse, above all by the British, to reduce a possible integrative urge toward continentalist (Euro-Gaullist) aspirations.

The legacy of two world wars remains a central factor in shaping European governments' policies; prevention of illegitimate violations of sovereignty was a principal reason for their support of the establishment of the UN, the EU, and NATO. This view lays behind the general European opposition to the Bush Administration's doctrine of pre-emptive action. European observers believed that there was an absence of anything that could be called international security architecture, in part because the United States, in this view, avoided reliance on the UN at the time of major international crises which took place over the past two decades. This critical attitude to American foreign policy was partly smoothed during the two periods of Obama presidency, but the essence of Atlanticist ideology became progressively more monistic. Despite the existence of regional differentiation within Europe, elitist views on the strategy of partnership with the US differed from one country to another and went beyond traditional differentiation between «old» and «new» Europe. Although the views on foreign policy issues vary across the continent and no single European discourse on the partnership with the US is visible, there exists a hegemonic EU discourse in which the expression and formation of national discourses takes place and which reflects the quintessence of Atlanticist orientation.

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КОНЦЕПЦИЯ АТЛАНТИЗМА ВО ВРЕМЕННОЙ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ: ТРЕНДЫ ИСТОРИИ И СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИИ

Стратегическое партнерство между странами Евросоюза и США является одним из актуальных вопросов в области международных отношений. Большинство соглашений, достигнутых в рамках двусторонних отношений между двумя сторонами, затрагивают вопросы торговли и проблемы внешней политики. Реализация политических инициатив в данных сферах в значительной степени зависит от приверженности атлантизму как квази-идеологии, которая подразумевает всестороннюю поддержку сближения между Европой и Америкой. В общем понимании разница в проекции власти между двумя стратегическими факторами, представляющими западную цивилизацию, выступает следствием многочисленных факторов, включая их разный военный потенциал, политическую мотивацию, региональные приоритеты, различное восприятие внешних угроз и стратегии безопасности. С другой стороны, необходимо объяснить, является ли общественная поддержка трансатлантического партнерства подлинно основанной на общих ценностях и долгосрочных интересах стран, или она ограничена и обусловлена краткосрочными факторами, такими как отношение к личностям американских президентов, непредвиденным внешнеполитическим событиям, что заметно по реакции на инициативы американской администрации в проведении внешней политики.

В данной статье определение термина «атлантизм» позаимствовано у авторов Грегера и Хэугевики (2009) с целью обозначить особый тип политической идентичности и ориентации, укорененной в привязанности к географическому местоположению, опыту исторических связей с США, определенному отношению к европейской интеграции. Представлен обзор подходов классических теорий международных отношений к анализу концепции атлантизма с начала 20 века. Один из них, следующий в логике рационалистского мышления, применим к рассмотрению стратегического выбора государств как структурно предопределенного. Согласно ему, их долгосрочные интересы предопределены извне, что означает, что они могут быть объяснены с отсылкой к внешним факторам, таким как геополитика, отношения к ним «великих держав» и переделу сфер влияния. Хотя данный подход к изучению внешней идентичности может быть во многих отношениях полезен, он менее применим при более глубоком анализе, где целью является проследить изменения в европейских странах с очевидно укорененной атлантистской идентичностью, таких как Великобритания и Италия, и в странах с выраженной исторической традицией антиамериканизма, подобно Франции. Вместе с тем, несмотря на оформление в последнее десятилетие концепции «нового атлантизма», существует очевидная эволюционная преемственность в рамках интеллектуальной традиции, основы которой были заложены в конце 19 века.

Ключевые слова: атлантизм, атлантическое сообщество, Атлантический Совет, западная цивилизация, Липманн, Стрэйт, расширение НАТО, американская внешняя политика, международные отношения, либеральный институционализм, теория мира, реализм, конструктивизм.

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