

UDC 316.34/35

*G. Csepeli, A. Örkény***NATIONAL IDENTITY IN EUROPE (Part II)**

The paper describes the stock of knowledge of modern national identity identifying various elements such as spontaneous national identity based on categorization, thematizations, typifications and relevances, interpretive structures, attitudes, symbols, values, probabilities and national ideology. All these elements are embedded in the semantic universe created by the name of the nation. Empirical results are presented to demonstrate the varieties of national experience across Europe.

*Keywords:* national identity, stock of knowledge, cross national comparison, empirical investigation.

**Nationalism: types of national identification**

Atop the pyramid of national knowledge base one may see the ideological contents of the world's representation through a national prism, which enables people to imagine and experience "national self-centeredness" or national uniqueness. These contents are sustained by the affective and cognitive structures described earlier, present and operating in the consciousness of broad strata of the national society. The contents of national ideology, however, do not reach but a narrower social stratum since their acquisition rests on knowledge of the arts, history, politics, economics, and sociology. Elevating the nation above universal humanity, nationalist ideology represents it as the carrier of special aesthetic, ethical, and mental values. Once absorbed into one's identity, nationalism affords a person—on the grounds of spontaneous national identification and fueled by national pride—to view themselves as superior to people belonging to other nations, irrespective of their individual talents and achievements. This "added value" granted by nationalism is available and effective in every situation when nations compete with each other. The Olympic Games, for instance, present such a situation where the victories bring glory not only to the winners but to their nation states. Wars waged between nation states likewise arouse nationalist emotions, through the fun house mirror in which one's own country appears superior and the nemesis inferior.




Fig. 1. Ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (aggregated average on a 100-point scale)

Drawing on the pyramid model of the national knowledge base, the following scale set up by Dekker and Malova [9] serves to reveal the nationalist potential based on a series of statements that range from spontaneous national identity to nationalist identification.

As argued earlier, the positive affective core of modern national identity is ethnocentrism, which classifies the human world according to the conceptual binary of in-group versus out-group [ 25]. On the ISSP survey's questionnaire, four statements represented the ethnocentric antecedents of modern national identity. The respondents were asked to determine the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the content of each statement. Lumping all the answers together, we set up a 100-point scale demonstrating the degree of ethnocentrism observed in each country (see Fig. 1)

The highest values of ethnocentrism were found, as the figure shows, in Turkey and Russia; the lowest ones in the core countries of the EU. These differences are relative, however, since all the regions' citizens expressed ethnocentric sentiments. At least one half of the population in every European country, according to the figure above, approves ethnocentrism. This ethnocentrism is, nonetheless, less vigorous among the peoples in Western European countries than among those in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, as with the choice of criteria for national categorization, the similarities were larger than the differences across the regions. Therefore, once again, we attempted to uncover the relative differences. Drawing on our mathematical statistical procedure, we have created the main component that measures ethnocentrism, whose values for the different regions can be seen on Fig. 2.




Fig. 2. The relative weight of ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averaged factor scores)

Within Europe, the ethnocentric approach to national community is the least present in the EU core countries and the south EU countries. Among the exceptions are EU countries outside the continent and north EU countries with relatively higher values of ethnocentrism. No less surprising is the relatively moderate presence of this attitude found in Central Europe, although it may be due to the conspicuously high levels measured in Russia and Turkey. The latter, especially, stands out with an extreme level of ethnocentrism. The question is, how the intensity of this attitude changed over time. Fig. 3 provides an answer.

Ethnocentrism may be seen as the unchanging tribal component of collective identity. We could not observe substantial fluctuations between 1995 and 2003 in any of the regions. When the countries are viewed separately, only Great-Britain exhibits a moderate yet continuous rise, possibly forecasting the Brexit in 2016.

Pride and ethnocentrism nourish the positive sentiments of national identity. Besides these, fears, uneasy sentiments, tragic experiences and traumas occur in the life of every nation, adding a darker tone to national identity. Some nations are more apt to resolve these issues than others.




Fig. 3. Ethnocentrism in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 1995–2013 (aggregate averages on a 100-point scale)

In the survey one question inquired about these negative sentiments asking respondents whether they felt ashamed of their respective countries. The resultant figures' breakdown is shown for individual countries since the contribution of regional context is negligible in this case (Fig. 4).




Fig. 4. The incidence of shame toward one's nation in Europe, by countries, 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

A cursory look at our data suggests that in the European countries the feeling of shame is present in one's national identity. At least to a medium degree, in every country this controversial feeling is part of people's sense of belonging to the nation, although some countries are apparently more affected by shame than others where this feature is less characteristic. The Czech Republic tops the list with Croatia right behind it, which in turn is followed by Sweden, Great-Britain, Ireland, and the three Baltic nations. Citizens of Turkey, Switzerland, Hungary, and Germany appear to be less fraught with shame for their country.

Certainly we would be hard pressed to find a nation whose history would offer no reason for shame. Crimes have been committed in every nation's past – some acknowledged, others swept under the rug. It is quite possible that the ratio of owned and disowned collective crimes would account for the degree to which shame is common or generally viewed as a legitimate sentiment.

It is of particular interest to observe on a timeline how in each country the sense of shame (or lack thereof) changed during a period of nearly a quarter century (Fig. 5)




Fig. 5. The incidence of shame felt about one's country in Europe in 1995, 2003, and 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

The most intriguing finding is that, with the exceptions of Russia and Hungary. The subjective sense of shame about one's nation rose in all the observed European countries between 1995 and 2003. The table shows that the Russians stood apart since the start of our study. In 1995 and 2003 they reported the highest levels of shame, which subsequently dropped to the average of the figures from European nations. It may be argued that shame among the Russian people became "normalized." In contrast, the Hungarians did not express a strong sense of shame at all. While the figures dwindled later, the shift was not too significant. In the majority of the countries, however, we see a trend of growing shame.

Underlying the fluctuations over time of the expression of shame, no corresponding increase or decrease of perpetrators could be found but rather a shift in the politics of national remembrance. In the 21st century, the majority of Europe's countries reevaluated their histories, resulting in an enhanced awareness of morally reprehensible past acts and actors and, subsequently, the rehabilitation of victims with a focus on their grievances. The turn of memory politics that accounts for the rising trend in people expressing shame toward their country was associated with various deeds and victims: the colonial past in Great-Britain; the Civil War in Spain; the ambiguous neutrality during World War 2 in Sweden, or the amicable relationships sustained in Lithuania and Slovakia with nationalist socialist Germany. In the same vein, national self-image in Ireland was tarnished by terrorism in Northern Ireland, while in Germany the revival of horrendous mem-

ories from the Nazi era could have aroused this crisis of national identity. Slovenia had to face the negative memories from the Yugoslav era, whereas the Hungarians have yet to undergo their own memory political turn. While Russians have had such a turn in remembrance, it will take a long time before they are able to reflect on their national past without controversial feelings [3].

Nationalist ideology is the next element of the national knowledge base. Earlier we have discussed the segments of the pyramid-shaped knowledge base helping to uncover the national potential. We set out discussing the feeling of closeness toward one's country, then proceeded to address national categorization and analyzed the substance of national pride and ethnocentrism. Finally, as a counter test, we discussed the sentiment of national shame.

Exclusive national categorization, admiration for one's country, the absence of shame arising from historical guilt, and ethnocentrism do not necessarily amount to nationalism. It is only when ethnocentrism entirely pervades the community's life and functions as a systemic ideology to generate ideas about national existence, that one can claim the prevalence of nationalism. In such cases the political character of a country as a whole is defined by nationalism – from the economic to foreign and cultural policies. Nationalism was quantified with reference to six statements in the ISSP investigations. Some of them measured its political manifestations such as the claim that "international organizations vindicate too much power vis-à-vis national governments, which should stand up for the nation's interests under all circumstances, even at the risk of conflicts." Other statements probed the economic facets of this ideology such as the claim that "domestic goods have to enjoy pride of place over foreign ones"; "foreigners should be barred from purchasing land" or, finally, that "multinationals bankrupt domestic producers." Statements expressing cultural nationalism included the imperative of airing domestic shows on television. All statements boiled down to the unconditional privileging of one's own country over others. The respondents had a 5-grade scale to mark the extent to which they did or did not agree with each claim. The values of support for particular claims measured in the European region can be seen on Fig. 6, transformed into 100-point scales.




Fig. 6. Support for nationalist themes in Europe as a whole, 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

The overall image of Europe shows that, irrespective of addressing political, economic or cultural issues, nationalism is present with more than medium-level intensity on the continent. The only comment to add is that economy-related nationalist views are slightly more popular than views about the cultural field where they were not put forward very forcefully.

The above figures lead us to conclude that nationalist beliefs about particular themes hinge on a latent nationalist disposition. Therefore, we have devised a general aggregated nationalism index based on the six items, once again, on a 100-point scale. (see Fig. 7) We assumed that the penetration of general nationalism would vary more markedly across different regions in 2013.




Fig. 7. The intensity of nationalism in Europe measured by an aggregate index: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2003 (averages on 100-point scale)

The figures suggest that, even though differences on nationalism can be detected between regions, it penetrates all of them, including Russia and Turkey at a level exceeding 50 per cent. It is well-known that the European Union was established to further the political and economic integration of its member states, which assumes a balance between national and European interests. This equilibrium may be jeopardized by the ubiquity of nationalism across Europe, whether it concerns economic issues, political power, national sovereignty or the cultural terrain.

Nationalism and the autonomy of national policies are comparatively less favored in the European Union's core countries and Scandinavia, a shade more so in Great-Britain and the Mediterranean countries, whereas it is quite popular in Central Europe, Russia, and Turkey. The differences accurately reflect the diverse perspectives and strategies applied to current European conflicts.

Yet we cannot contend that the spread of nationalism in present-day European thinking and politics is the negative consequence of actual crises. A look at the period between 1995 and 2013 in terms of nationalism's penetration will convince the reader that it is a phenomenon deeply embedded in all the European societies (see Fig. 8.).

Fig. 8 shows that nationalism has had a solid and continuous popular support in Europe over twenty-five years. Despite some fluctuation occurring in every region, stability has persisted. While the EU has been engaged in its enlargement, along making the national borders increasingly porous and establishing transnational cooperation in the economic, political, and cultural areas, the robust forces of nationalism have not disappeared.

Of course, the regional trends, once again, may conceal the more pronounced differences among the countries. Neither Russia nor Turkey are members of the European Union. In 2013 these countries exhibited the most susceptibility toward nationalist ideology with 73 per cent support shown in Turkey and 68 percent in Russia. But Central and East European countries are part of the EU, yet appear no less attracted to nationalism. (The respective figures are 67 per cent in the Czech Republic, 66 per cent in Hungary, and 65 per cent in both Croatia and Serbia.) Also the surprisingly extensive adherence to the national idea in France (65 per cent) gave us pause for thought.

Societies that gravitate the least toward nationalist ideologies can be found on the western territories of Germany (46 per cent), Norway (48 per cent), Sweden (49 per cent) Iceland (52 per cent), and Denmark (52 per cent). Within Belgium, Brussels needs to be mentioned with 52 per cent support.




Fig. 8. The penetration of nationalist thought in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 1995, 2003, 2013 (averages on 100-point scale)

Nationalism is present in every country and may well be around in the future, too. The question is the extent of its penetration. Nationalism as a dominant ideology may fare especially well in countries that fall behind in the competition among nations; the underdogs will likely blame integration, globalization, and transnational economic, political and cultural forces for their failures. However, the struggle for transnational cooperation, economic, political, and cultural inclusion, on the one hand, versus parochial nationalism, on the other, will never end.

The positive emotional foundation of one's national identity rests on belonging to a group perceived to be familiar, close, and natural, whose power draws on endogenous and exogenous determinants. It is a sign of one's solid national identity if its positive foundations are formed, primarily, of endogenous determinants. If identification with the nation is fraught with complexes and insecurities, one's capacity to maintain positive sentiments will require reliance on external determinants. This, in turn, would result in a gap between the national in-group and the out-group.

Xenophobia is a powerful means of distancing oneself from the out-group. Through the looking glass of the negative image drawn of the out-group, the in-group gains superior valuation, thus becoming a refuge for those who are ridden by uncertainties. We have measured the extent of xenophobia using nine statements. Some statements formulated pejorative judgments about strangers – in this case, immigrants –, for example, associating them with crime, accusing them of taking away of jobs from the locals or posing a threat to the host culture. Other statements contained favorable judgments such as immigrants enrich the host culture, they bring economic benefits, and legal migrants must be integrated into the host country. Xenophobia could be inferred when the respondent agreed with the negative judgments and rejected the positive ones.

As to the extent of agreement and disagreement with particular statements in the entire European region, the overall image seems quite varied (see Fig. 9).

Opinions strikingly converged in disagreeing with the statement that the quota of immigrants could be raised in the respondent's own country. As to the negative and positive statements, responses tended to diverge as reflected by the values in the medium range. There was relatively strong consensus on two other statements: one urging sanctions against illegal immigrants, and another – a positive one – underscoring the essential importance of providing equal educational opportunities for immigrant youths.




Fig. 9. The extent of agreement regarding migration and migrants in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

In comparing regions in terms of level of xenophobia, we can see that all are affected by it. In western Europe, the hatred for strangers was somewhat more restrained with the exception of Great-Britain, where it reached virulent levels as early as 2013, possibly forecasting the Brexit that took place three years later. In contrast, in Southern European countries we found a relatively moderate level of aversion toward migrants despite the rise of immigration at the time. In Eastern Europe, Russia, and Turkey resistance to foreigners was considerable (Fig. 10).




Figure 10. The strength of xenophobia's aggregated index in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)



Beyond the regional differences, there are also differences among the countries. In Western Europe, xenophobia is higher than average in Belgium and Great-Britain; in the north, Finland stands out with 50 per cent. In the Southern European countries, the figures are markedly low, barely exceeding 40 per cent. Moving to Eastern Europe, we measured values around 50 per cent in the Baltic states as compared to 55 per cent found in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia and the considerable lower figures, 46 to 48 per cent, measured in the Balkans.

As earlier in our study, it is worthwhile viewing the trends in a temporal dimension, as shown in Fig. 11.




Fig. 11. The strength of xenophobia's aggregated index in Europe in a temporal dimension: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 1995, 2003, 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

Retrospectively, from the perspective of the recent migration crisis, it is noteworthy that over the period between 1995 and 2013 xenophobia receded in all the regions of Europe. This trend was most marked in the South and Central Europe, but the decrease occurred also in the EU's core countries, Great-Britain between 2003 and 2013 as well as in Russia.

The reasons for the change in public opinion are not the same in the "West" as in the "East". The outpouring of anti-immigrant sentiments in the West may have been tempered by the continuous and, at the time seemingly successful, economic immigration; the contribution of newcomers to the economic achievements of the host countries, and the more or less effective integration processes. In the East a gradual shift in attitude toward inclusion and acceptance brought on by multi-faceted intercultural interactions, could be witnessed.

Arguably, the migrant wave of 2015 cut deeply into this encouraging process. Due to its suddenness, and predictability, sheer size, and dramatized treatment by the media, the arrival of refugees in Europe caused a shock effect among the population of numerous countries. In some of groups all over Europe, the event provoked fear, insecurity, suspicion, and plain rejection exacerbated by the tragic terror attacks committed by extremist Islamists. Particularly powerful was the xenophobic reaction in Central Europe fueled by moral panic.

In 2013 xenophobia was relatively low in a number of countries such as Ireland, Iceland, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden, with the level of immigrant rejection fluctuating between 40 and 45 per cent.

The results received in response to questions on migration made it possible for us to not only observe the level of general resistance to strangers but to investigate each of the multiple narratives concerning migrants. One set of questions presented a collection of common stereotypes related to immigration (for example, "they take away our jobs"; "they spur crime"; "they erode our culture" or "they do not bring economic

benefits"). The other set of questions focused on the political aspects of immigration (for example, "illegal immigration has to be stemmed", "the quota of immigrants needs to be reduced", and "integration should not be pushed"). The middle columns on Fig. 12 demonstrate the respondents' acceptance of negative stereotypes; the third columns show their support for policies to stem migration while the first columns indicate the level of general xenophobia in the region.

We have found in every region that, underlying the overall rejection, there is an adherence to negative stereotypes rather than to expectations on immigration policy. The exceptions are the Scandinavian countries where no distinction could be made between the impact of stereotypes and policy expectations. Our earlier claim is thus corroborated, according to which xenophobic sentiments are not related immigration policies but are produced by factors such as psychological detachment, the incitement to collective fear, cultural dominance, and moral panic. This distinction was conspicuous in the everyday thinking of Russians and Turks, and was quite apparent in the EU's eastern regions as well.




Fig. 12. The strength of the aggregated index regarding general xenophobia, including adherence to collective stereotypes about immigrants and the support of anti-immigrant policies in Europe: EU regions, Russia, and Turkey, 2013 (averages on a 100-point scale)

Conventional research on xenophobia tends to concentrate on attitudes of discrimination and rejection. The ISSP survey went beyond these to formulate a number of questions about acceptance and inclusion, too. Thus we had the opportunity to compare the frequency of our respondents' approval of positive *versus* negative statements in the different regions. Our factor analysis carried out on the full range of statements offers a sharp image of the relative differences discerned among the regions, as seen on Fig. 13.

In the EU's core countries and especially in the Scandinavian and the Southern European region agreement with positive claims clearly prevails, while agreement with the negative ones is much less common. Almost a negative mirror image of this is presented by Central Europe, Russia and Turkey where, compared to the "West", negative statements were more popular. Russian and Turkish respondents, in particular, had a hard time identifying with statements of acceptance and inclusion of immigrants.




Fig. 13. The factor structure of agreement with statements concerning the acceptance of migrants in Europe: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (averages of factor scores)




Fig. 14. Standard deviation of standpoints concerning immigrants' assimilation versus letting immigrants preserve their customs: EU regions, Russia and Turkey, 2013 (percentages)

A significantly lower level of xenophobia was measured in Western European societies than in those located east of them. Yet in the "West", we detected also a distinct expectation from migrants to assimilate. (Fig. 14). A sizable proportion of respondents agreed with the claim that "those who fail to appropriate fully our county's culture and traditions cannot become first class citizens." This idea found few followers in Central and Eastern Europe.

We may say that the sentiment of rejecting the "other" is observable both in Western and Eastern parts of Europe, but reactions are different. In the "East" overt xenophobia that denies assimilation prevails, whereas in the "West" the rejection is covered up by the imperative of assimilation.

### The Explanatory Models of National Identity

In the following section of our analysis we will attempt to reconstruct the building up and functioning of a nationalist belief system as a process. In doing so, we will employ the path-model of linear regression. This method enables us to illuminate particular social psychological mechanisms in terms of their impact on the formation of nationalism, as they are grafted on one another in accordance with our pyramid model discussed earlier.

In unveiling the paths to nationalism, we will investigate the manner in which the most important variables of the national knowledge base are connected to one another (Fig. 15). The models clarify that, if nationalism is the end point, to what extent it is determined by factors such as a person's spontaneous national identity; exclusionary or narrow national categorization, symbolic or modern justification of national pride, ethnocentrism and, finally, xenophobic sentiments.




Fig. 15. Nationalism's path-model of linear regression in the EU countries, 2013

Explanation: This Figure exhibits the relationships that either strengthen or weaken the penetration of nationalism in Europe. The arrows signify the positive or negative direction of the relationship, depending on the sign in front of the figures, which in turn indicate the strength of the relationships. We may distinguish between direct and indirect factors accounting for the intensity of nationalism. In case of the former the arrows represent a direct connection to the explanation of nationalism, while in the latter the arrows exert their influence on nationalism's intensity indirectly, through mediating factors.

As to the direct effects, this figure shows that almost every element of the national knowledge base has an immediate effect on nationalism. The strongest impact is produced by xenophobia and ethnocentrism. The more adamantly someone scorns and excludes aliens from the national community, and the more someone values his/her own nation over others, the more he/she will identify with the content of nationalist ideologies.

An instructive outcome of our application of the path model is that national pride built on the themes of modern societal development precludes the appearance of nationalism and negatively correlates with nationalistic beliefs. Accordingly, the antidote to nationalism may be found in a scenario where people take pride in their country's democratic polity, affluence, and equality. However, when pride in modern societal values is coupled with ethnocentrism (indirect effect), the former becomes a supportive cognitive background to nationalist ideology.

The symbolic/narrative pride associated with the country's past, culture, language, and history directly contributes to the potency of nationalism. But even here there is an opposite path: When pride is grounded in modernization and is free of ethnocentrism (indirect path), it may just as well lead to the eschewing of nationalism as a systemic and system-justifying belief.

The exclusive national categorization is another critical cognitive aspect of, and background to, nationalist ideas. It is a direct effect but, when paired up with ethnocentrism and xenophobia, it adds even more to one's investment in nationalism.

Our final yet crucial point gleaned from our analysis is that emotional attachment to one's nation and love for the homeland does not inevitably produce a nationalist. If we refuse to exclude others from the national community merely for being born in another land, lacking proficiency in our language, and having ancestors looking different from our own; if furthermore, we shun xenophobia and ethnocentrism in our affection toward our country, we may still end up happy members of the national community, unencumbered by the ideology of nationalism. Perhaps this sums up best what patriotism and patriotic attachment to the national idea means.

The individual countries' and regions' path models do not offer significantly different explanatory schemes for nationalism. The affective and cognitive background of this ideology seems universally valid in all of the Union's countries.

In order to control our finding, we examined the cases of Turkey and Russia to detect the difference between these two countries, on the one hand, and the EU countries, on the other, in terms of their paths leading to nationalism (Fig. 16 and 17).




Fig. 16. The path-model of linear regression for Russian nationalism, 2013

In Russia's case, we found a striking deviation of ethnocentrism exceeding xenophobia contributing to the explanation of nationalism's intensity. The former's *beta* value of 0.30 and the latter's of 0.20 suggests that the penetration of nationalism in Russia derives foremost from overvaluing itself while undervaluing other countries – rather than from the lesser factor of excluding or including aliens. Neither does pride have a direct explanatory force whether concerning the country's modernizing achievements or the symbolic/narrative stature of the Russian people – except when pride is linked with ethnocentrism. The cognitive psychological allure of Russian nationalism thus lies predominantly in its ethnocentrism [30].

Interestingly, the two types of national pride are far more closely related here, meaning that the symbiosis of the double profile of pride is stronger than in the case of European countries. Furthermore the role of spontaneous emotional attachment is appreciably more separate from the cognitive space fueling nationalism in Russian society. Furthermore, there is no direct link between exclusive ideas of the nation and nationalist ideologies.




Fig. 17. The path-model of linear regression for Turkish nationalism, 2013

The explanatory space of Turkish nationalism resembles the pattern of the EU countries more than the Russian one, albeit with some unique features of its own. As regards the spread of nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and the nation's exclusive idea seem to play a similar role as in Europe. But the Turks' pride in their nation is unrelated to their version of nationalism – whether the former is rooted in the country's modernizing accomplishments or its symbolic/narrative aspects. And while in Turkey – like elsewhere – spontaneous emotional attachment cannot be linked to nationalist thoughts, neither is it tied up with xenophobia, which was characteristic of Europe.

### Types of National Identity

Whereas path-models display the structure of national identity and the variables determining nationalism as its end point, nothing can be uncovered about as to how a population is divided in terms of their national identity, if relying on these models only. To answer this question, we have conducted a cluster analysis, relying on variables employed in the path-model.

Cluster analysis made on the European countries' samples was helpful in identifying four groups whose members show marked differences along the variables determining national identity. Lumping together all the samples, we found that the members of the second most frequent group (28 per cent) gave responses suggestive of a robust nationalist ideology in all the dimensions of our cluster analysis. Therefore, we have tagged this group as *radical nationalists*. The second group – the smallest one in our sample – has received the label *ordinary nationalists* (15 per cent). For this type, national identity, more than anything, is a taken-for-granted relationship, subject to temporary mobilization by extreme situations (for example, war, terrorist attacks or outstanding sports achievements). The third rather large group came across as what we have called *moderate nationalists* (31 per cent). This group cannot be defined as excessively nationalist, ethnocentric or xenophobic either. Yet they take considerable pride in their nation both for modernizing achievements and symbolic/narrative themes. Although considering themselves part of the national community, they only listed a narrow set of requirements from "others" to become citizens. Lastly, the fourth significant type has been called *illiberal nationalists* (25 per cent). Their primary difference from the radical nationalists lies in their primary dependence on symbolic themes for their pride in the nation; as well, this group is not made up of committed ethnocentrists. Yet they strongly adhere to nationalist and xenophobic ideas and are closely attached to their home country.

The specific groups displayed characteristic configurations across the European regions (Fig. 18).




Fig. 18. Types of national identity in the EU regions, regional distribution of clusters, 2003 (percentages)

The percentage of illiberal nationalists can be seen to rise steeply as we move at the map from west to east and from north to south, demonstrating the contemporary validity of Jenő Szűcs' s classic theory (1983). The other finding that corroborates it is the steep drop of moderate nationalists' share in the countries from north to south and from west to east.

Ordinary nationalism, which is immune to nationalist ideology, is most prevalent in the Southern European countries. The most intriguing outcome on this figure is the radical nationalists' presence, albeit not as a dominant group, in the whole of Europe, irrespective of the region. Even though our data go back to 2003, they lend themselves to reading as forecasting later developments, such as Brexit and the ascending trend of Islamophobia in Western Europe.

The overall picture barely alters with the inclusion of Russia and Turkey into our analysis (Fig. 19). In the light of what transpired more recently, it is hardly surprising to observe the surge of radical nationalism in Turkey. In Russia, the presence of ordinary nationalists is quite conspicuous, albeit their percentage might have shrunken since the 2013 data collection, as indicated by the already significant share of the illiberal nationalist group in that very year.




Fig. 19. Types of national identity in the EU regions, Russia and Turkey, regional distribution of clusters, 2003 (percentages)

### European versus National Identity

The key issue of the European unification process lies in the EU's ability to offer such powerful integration and European identity for the citizens of its member states as to compete with their national identities rooted, as they are, in centuries of political and historical traditions. In this section of our discussion we will attempt to find out more about the current state of the progress toward a shared European consciousness: In which group of countries can a more or a less tangible European identity be seen to have formed? Have the countries' relationships to Europe changed over the past decade? Presently this problem is gaining in importance, following the challenges and crises of the past years – the financial meltdown of 2008, the crisis in Greece, the quandary about migration, and Brexit – which have eroded the EU's political system and, along with it, the idea of a shared European polity and community of values.

The history of the EU may be described as a broadening and ever more complex process of unification. Initially, integration occurred in security policy, the economy and the markets, which subsequently led directly to the next phase of political cooperation. Political integration brought forward the need to define the Union as a political community, which implied that the members of this ever enlarging organization should think through the actual content of belonging. As an inevitable consequence of this process, re-evaluating the member states' political legal status and their inter-relationships became urgent – along with the imperatives to clarify the legal and social norms ensuring the cohesion of the community, draft the European constitution, and elaborate the idea of a European identity [8]. The latter problem has become of paramount significance. Over the past few decades, unification proceeded largely on the grounds of geopolitical realities, the political will of individual governments, and the interests of nation states. But the "confederation" thus created can less and less do without the active support of the citizens of the EU countries and thus a broad-based social and political legitimacy.



For the EU citizens, the increasing tangle of concerns raises the question ever more pressingly: What will guarantee their security, well-being, and the preservation of their political values? Moreover, what role may national politics play in achieving common European solutions?

Already at its onset, the ISSP research on national identity focused heavily on the in-depth exploration of the contextual aspects of the European Union. Due to the constraints of the research, the scope the questions addressed was limited, yet in all the three survey periods three cardinal questions were repeatedly posed on the questionnaire (Fig. 20). Let us quote them:

"In your opinion, the EU membership is advantageous or disadvantageous to your country?"

"Do you believe that your country's government has to abide by the decisions made by the Union even when it disagrees with them?"

"Do you think that the EU should have a) quite a bit more, b) more, c) less or d) quite a bit less power than the governments of its member states?"




Fig. 20. Support for the EU in the member states, measured by 3 questions 2013 (averages on a hundred-point scale)

The public opinion in the surveyed countries showed great variance in their reply as to whether the EU is advantageous or disadvantageous for their country. France stands out with its positivity on the issue (unfortunately, Germany was not surveyed on this question in 2013); likewise Belgium, Denmark, the two Baltic states, and Spain displayed an optimistic climate. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Finland, however, seemed more skeptical. The picture offered by the off-continent EU member states was mixed: Respondents in Ireland were quite positive, while in Great-Britain they appeared highly critical toward the Union.

Far smaller differences were detected among the countries in regards to the approval of common EU decisions and the EU's leverage. The averages of the opinions in each country concentrated in the middle range, suggesting that the public was highly divided everywhere. This was seen most spectacularly in Ireland and Denmark where the people were sharply polarized in their assessment of the advantages and disadvantages arising from the EU membership.

Again, lumping together the answers to the EU-related questions, we sought to identify types. The cluster analysis allowed us to distinguish between four profiles as shown on Fig. 21.




Fig. 21. Cluster typology concerning the EU's support in the EU region, 2013 (percentages)

The proportion of those favoring by all means the EU membership and an increased leverage of Union policies is high, predominantly, in the core countries and Scandinavia, amounting to one third of all the respondents. At the opposite end are the EU skeptics whose share is less than one fourth of the respondents in all the regions. The exception is Great-Britain where the public opinion is remarkably polarized. (We should add that the share of Central Europe's skeptics comes close to one fourth.) Noteworthy is the large percentage of those emphasizing the EU's benefits among the non-continental EU countries (40 per cent), which may be attributed to Ireland. In the Mediterranean and Central European region, however, the relative majority would favor a larger decision making power assigned to the Union. This by no means should be taken as evident, considering that since 2015 this issue has been provoking fierce objection from those who worry about national sovereignty in Central Europe.

#### Cluster typology concerning the EU's support in 15 of its member states (percentages)

Country	EU support in all respects (high value)	Following decisions (high value)	EU	Attributing benefits to EU membership (high value)	EU support in all respects (low value)	All
Belgium	36.5	30		23.3	10.2	100.0
Croatia	13.6	34.6		23.3	28.5	100.0
Czech Republic	15.4	29.8		19.5	35.4	100.0
Denmark	40.7	17.0		21.7	20.6	100.0
Finland	16.5	34.7		20.6	28.1	100.0
France	28.6	18.2		38.2	15.0	100.0
Great-Britain	10.6	18.2		26.2	45.1	100.0
Hungary	21.6	53.7		6.0	18.7	100.0
Iceland	40.0	1.3		58.7	0.0	100.0
Latvia	12.6	25.5		35.1	26.8	100.0
Lithuania	22.9	25.5		42.1	9.5	100.0
Portugal	20.6	36.2		21.8	21.4	100.0
Slovenia	22.8	37.2		24.1	15.9	100.0
Spain	30.1	33.2		17.9	18.9	100.0

A glance at particular countries allowed us to discern the following notable differences (see Table): Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, and Spain stand out as the most supportive EU countries as opposed to the Czech Republic and Great-Britain showing the highest degree of Euroscepticism. Hungary is well below the average. Great-Britain and Ireland represent contrasting views about the Union. In 2013, the Skeptics made up 45 per cent in Britain and merely 15 per cent in Ireland. Every other person in Ireland deems the EU beneficial.

After setting up a scale to measure the degree of general support and skepticism for the EU based on the three statements, we obtained figures clearly suggestive of a pervasive uncertainty regarding the EU in the European public mind (Fig. 22). None of the regions' average value reaches 50 per cent, indicating a fundamental ambivalence and relative skepticism across the board. Especially small is Great Britain's value on the scale (36 per cent), which, presumably, reflects the country's general attitude, as against the already mentioned highly positive perspective among the Irish of the EU.




Fig. 22. The aggregated index of the EU's support, 2013 (index averages of the regions)

The evaluation of the overall picture offered by the 2013 data becomes more refined if comparing it with data collected in the 2003 survey. The most crucial insight gained from the comparison is that the Europeans' weary and critical standpoint regarding the EU is far from being a recent development since no genuinely consequential shifts occurred over the past ten years. Yet it is remarkable that approval of the Union rose significantly in the Scandinavian countries, while it fell from a relatively high value in Southern Europe (Fig. 23).


Finally, let us explore the connections between our respondents' support for the EU and their patriotic sentiments, especially, their nationalism. The linear regression path-model below depicts support for the EU as an end point and the various determinations by factors such as spontaneous affective attachment to Europe; exclusive national categorization; national pride justified by modernizing or symbolic/narrative themes; ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and, lastly, nationalism. (Fig. 24).

Support for the European Union is influenced by two, largely unrelated, cognitive patterns. First, and rather surprisingly, the sense of closeness to Europe has the greatest immediate impact on one's support of the EU. The larger this variable is, the more we can anticipate the formation of a more robust EU-based identity. Second, a sense of closeness to Europe directly tempers xenophobia fed by nationalist isolation and ethnocentrism, which, which then turns into support for the EU.

The other cognitive pattern is linked with the penetration of nationalism. The stronger respondents identify with nationalist ideas, the less they will approve of European integration. Underlying nationalism one can detect all the cognitive factors countering the European integration that lead to the espousal of nationalist ideas, such as an ethnocentric perspective, exclusive national categorization, and the affective rejection of the EU.

Only xenophobia connects the two factors. The isolationist national attitude would by necessity refuse the acceptance and inclusion of foreigners, immigrants or refugees, as this would be incongruent with the shared European values and the affective charge of European-ness. However, when people are unaffected by

the traditional, exclusive, culturally unitary, historicizing, and nativist concept of the nation superimposing its interests above and beyond others, they will be culturally open and will develop an attendant sense of belonging to what Europe represents. Intrinsic to the above, is the sentiment that one is simultaneously a member of the national and the European community. This is what the dual legal status of national and EU citizenship represents and is the true meaning of a common supranational identity.



Note: In the ISSP survey of 2003 not all of the countries and regions were represented.

Fig. 23. The aggregate index of EU's support, 2003 and 2013 (averages of the regional indices)




Fig. 24. The linear regression path-models of the EU's member countries

The Europe-wide migrant and refugee crisis of 2015 therefore holds special significance. If it has intensified xenophobia in Europe, as indicated by recent research studies, and encouraged traditional nationalist political pursuits, as witnessed in Western and Central European states a year later, the legitimacy of European integration may be severely tarnished. Along with it, we might expect a decline in the recognition of shared interests as well as the solidity of a common European identity and a sense of belonging.

## Conclusions

The results of the comparative research studies conducted in European countries on national and European identity show the influence exerted by the historically formed regional position of particular countries on the frequency of patterns of national identification. Our data have indicated the persistent validity of Jenő Szűcs's (1983) theory about the three historical regions of the continent. Yet we also witness the emergence, tentative and slow as it may be, of a minority in the member states' societies which is able and willing to relinquish the symbolic rewards of nationalism and readily support the integration of EU members. This offers some hope that the regional differences in Europe will eventually fade. The examples of Turkey and Russia suggest, however, that the schism between countries within and without the EU will continue to stay with us.

## REFERENCES

1. Benveniste, E. (1935): *Origines de la formation des noms indo-européens*. Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve.
2. Berlant, L. (1991): *The Anatomy of National Fantasy. Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
3. Bernhard, M. – Kubik, J. (eds.) (2014): *Twenty years after Communism. The Politics of memory and Commemoration*. New York: Oxford University Press.
4. Csepeli, Gy. (1997): *National Identity in Contemporary Hungary*. New York: Atlantic Press – Columbia University Press.
5. Csepeli Gy. – Örkény A. (1998): Nemzetközi összehasonlító szociológiai vizsgálat a nemzeti identitásról. *Szociológiai Szemle*, 8 (3), 3–36. <http://www.szociologia.hu/dynamic/9803csepeli.htm>
6. Csepeli Gy. – Örkény A. – Székelyi M. (2002): *Nemzetek egymás tükrében*. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó.
7. Csepeli Gy. – Örkény A. – Székelyi M. – Poór J. – Várhalmi Z. (2007): *Nemzeti érzés és európai identitás*. Budapest: Arktisz Kiadó.
8. Deflem, M. – Pampel, F. C. (1996): The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Unification. *Social Forces*, 75 (1), 119–143.
9. Dekker, H. – Malova, M. (1997): Nationalism and its explanations. Paper presented at the first Dutch-Hungarian Conference in Interethnic Relations. Wassenaar: NIAS.
10. Dekker, H. (2000): *European Nations and Nationalism* Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
11. Elder, J. W. (1976): Comparative Cross-National Methodology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 2, 209–230. <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.so.02.080176.001233>
12. Festinger, L. (1976/1954): A társadalmi összehasonlítás elmélete. In Pataki F. (szerk.): *Pedagógiai szociálpszichológia*. Budapest: Gondolat, 259–291.
13. Gellner, E. (2009): *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
14. Haller, M. – Jowell, R. – Smith, T. W. (eds.) (2009): *The International Social Survey Programme. 1984–2009*. London–New York: Routledge.
15. Hamilton, D. – Gifford, R. (1976): Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 12 (4), 392–407. DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1031(76)80006-6.
16. Heidegger, M. 1998. *Pathways*. Cambridge University Press
17. Hunyady Gy. (1996): *Sztereotípiák a változó közgondolkodásban*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
18. Kántor Z. (2004): *Nacionalizmuselméletek. Szöveggyűjtemény*. Budapest: Rejtjel Könyvek. <http://adatbank.transindex.ro/belso.php?alk=53&k=5>
19. Kohn, M. L. (1987): Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy: American Sociological Association, 1987 Presidential Address. *American Sociological Review*, 52 (6), 713–731. [http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/images/asa/docs/pdf/1987%20Presidential%20Address%20\(Melvin%20Kohn\).pdf](http://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy/images/asa/docs/pdf/1987%20Presidential%20Address%20(Melvin%20Kohn).pdf)
20. Leerssen, J. Th. (2006): *National Thought in Europe*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
21. Le Vine, R. A. – Campbell, D. T. (1972): *Ethnocentrism. Theories of Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behaviour*. 7th ed. New York: Wiley.
22. Örkény, A. (2011): European Identity and National Attachment: Harmony or Dissonance. *Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 2 (1), 33–61. <http://cjssp.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php/cjssp/article/view/36/26>
23. Schumpeter, J. (1909): On the Concept of Social Value. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 23, 213–232.

24. Sherif, M. – Sherif, C. (1980): A vonatkoztatási csoport fogalma az emberi kapcsolatokban. In Csepeli Gy. (szerk.): Előítéletek és csoportközi viszonyok. Budapest: KJK. 347–391.
25. Smith, A. (1993): The Ethnic Origins of the Nations. Oxford: Blackwell.
26. Smith, T. W. (2009): National pride in comparative perspective. In Haller, M. – Jowell, R. – Smith, Tom W. (eds.): The International Social Survey Programme 1984-2009. London–New York: Routledge, 197–221.
27. Sumner, G. W. (1978): Népszokások. Szokások, erkölcsök, viselkedésmódok szociológiai jelentősége. Budapest: Gondolat.
28. Szűcs J. (1983): Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról. Budapest: Magvető.
29. Tajfel, H. – Billig, M. G. – Bundy, R. O. – Flament, C. (1971): Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149–177. [http://www.morilab.net/gakushuin/Tajfel\\_et\\_al\\_1971.pdf](http://www.morilab.net/gakushuin/Tajfel_et_al_1971.pdf)
30. Thompson, E. M. (2000): Imperial Knowledge. Russian Literature and Colonialism. Santa Barbara: Praeger an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC.
31. Wimmer, A. – Schiller, N. G. (2003): Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology. The International Migration Review, 37 (3), 576–610. [https://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/363230/mod\\_resource/content/0/ TextoApoio%201-NinaSchillerWimmer-MethodologicalNationalismStudies%20of%20Migration- 2003.pdf](https://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/363230/mod_resource/content/0/TextoApoio%201-NinaSchillerWimmer-MethodologicalNationalismStudies%20of%20Migration-2003.pdf)

Поступила в редакцию 15.09.2017

*Г. Чепели, А. Оркань*

### **НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ В ЕВРОПЕ (часть II)**

В статье описывается совокупность знаний по вопросу современной национальной идентичности, определяют ее различные элементы, такие как стихийная национальная идентичность, опирающаяся на категоризацию, тематизацию, типизацию и релевантность, а также интерпретирующие структуры, позиции, символы, ценности, возможности и национальная идеология. Все эти элементы встроены в семантическую вселенную под названием «нация». В статье представлены эмпирические результаты, демонстрирующие многообразие национального опыта в Европе.

*Ключевые слова:* национальная идентичность, совокупность знаний, межнациональное сравнение, эмпирическое исследование.

Dr. Gyorgy Csepeli,  
Professor of Sociology  
Institute for Social Relations,  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Eotvos Loránd University of Budapest  
H-1053, Budapest, Egyetem tér 1-3,  
Hungary  
E-mail: csepeli.gyorgy@tatk.elte.hu

Чепели Дьёрдь,  
Профессор социологии  
Институт социальных отношений  
Факультет социальных наук  
Будапештский университет  
H-1053, Будапешт, Университетская площадь, 1-3  
Венгрия  
E-mail: csepeli.gyorgy@tatk.elte.hu

Dr. Antal Örkény,  
Professor of Sociology, Director of Institute  
for Social Relations,  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Eotvos Loránd University of Budapest  
H-1053, Budapest, Egyetem tér 1-3,  
Hungary  
E-mail: orkeny@tatk.elte.hu

Оркань Антал,  
Профессор социологии,  
Директор Института социальных отношений  
Факультет социальных наук  
Будапештский университет  
H-1053, Будапешт, Университетская площадь, 1-3  
Венгрия  
E-mail: orkeny@tatk.elte.hu