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INTERPRETING CHINA'S STRATEGIC DISCOURSE: STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES OF THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT (SREB)

China's SREB is a geo-strategic program that has been initiated based on Beijing's judgment on its international and domestic environment. Building the SREB program serves the China grand strategy and satisfies the national demands. The Chinese government declared the 'community with a shared future for Mankind' is a national grand strategy and the guiding slogan of its foreign policy. This article interprets China's governmental discourse on the guiding slogan and Chinese academic efforts to justify the grand strategy. From the Chinese perspective, the construction of the SREB needs to adopt omnidirectional diplomacy, which includes dealing with its relations with great powers, with neighboring nations, and building regional regimes and mechanisms. China's grand strategy and three approaches sound ideal to some extent, but they demonstrate Chinese real concerns and ideas. In the long-term future, Russia will become more and more significant for China's SREB program and the grand strategy as a whole.

Keywords: SREB, BRI, grand strategy, omnidirectional foreign policy.

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Introduction

The SREB program, one segment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a critical foreign policy put forward by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013. This program straddles the Eurasian continent, connecting Asian and European land-based economic corridors, trade routes, and infrastructure construction in the countries along the SREB. It is presented as the contemporary manifestation of a Silk Road tradition and is of great significance for the development of regional economic cooperation. For China, the construction of the SREB is a complex and long-term strategy that considers the various elements of political, economic, and security dimensions in the geospatial space. While the SREB research is few, literature on the BRI appears diverse and debatable. Scholars discuss the BRI from different aspects, such as economics, finance, politics, etc. [1]; they hold various perspectives on the program's motivations, objectives, and impacts [2]. For instance, some Western scholars tend to think it a manifestation of China's global economic structures and a signal of a revisionist power [3-5], while others belittle the strategic value of the program, taking it as an apparatus to shift the country's surplus production [6-8]. However, according to the Chinese government's narratives, the SREB is a strategy. Chinese scholars describe the SREB as a meaningful geopolitical and geo-economic strategy and a valuable blueprint for the Chinese national interest and humanity [9-10].

Instead of focusing on the contradiction between Western arguments and Chinese statements, this article aims to explore how Chinese scholars interpret China's strategic objectives and approaches to the SREB through its governmental discourse. The considerations of this long-term strategy must be consistent with the overall goals of China's grand strategy; thus, the following section discusses China's rhetoric of grand strategy and understands the unique thinking about governmental slogan- 'a shared future for mankind'. Then, this article analyzes the three essential approaches to achieving the goals of the SREB, which reflect the guiding ideas underlying omnidirectional diplomacy.

Guiding Slogan- 'community with a shared future for mankind'

As an essential guiding slogan of China's foreign policy, 'community with a shared future for mankind' has attracted domestic and international attention. The Chinese government and academic main-

stream take the slogan as a grand strategic objective for China. The SREB is a practice to achieve the grand strategy. In other words, national strategic objectives guide the geostrategic choices of China's SREB construction. From the perspective of political realism, national interests determine a country's strategic goals based on the nation's strategic environment and the strategic resources it possesses [11]. China is no exception, and an assessment of the strategic environment also formulates its international strategy. President Xi Jinping pointed out that 'the world is undergoing great change that has never been seen in a century, but the time and the situation are on our side; this is where our strength, determination, and confidence lie [12].' China thinks that unprecedented changes in the international landscape are prominent, and 'time and momentum [shi yu shi]' correspond to the assessment of the global environment. In the 'time and momentum' is not only the environment element for setting strategic goals but also the effect of achieving strategic goals [13]. Since the 18th Communist Party Congress of China, the decision-makers have assessed the international situation, made top-level design and planning for China's diplomatic strategy, and provided 'Chinese solutions' to the significant issues concerning the fate of humanity. The Chinese government declared that the idea of 'a shared future for mankind' could resolve the questions about 'what kind of world to build and how to build this world'. The Chinese solutions have formed the concept of diplomacy with Chinese characteristics [14].

The grand objective of China's international strategy is to integrate the domestic and international situation based on its strategic judgment on domestic and global concerns. With an eye on the unprecedented situation of the world and based on the strategic needs of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, China has determined the macro-goals of international strategy and several operational goals in a concrete way. Since entering the 21st century, with the growth of China's strength and increased interaction with the international community, China has been wrapped up in the flood of world development in all aspects. China's actions and the changes in the international landscape are mutually influential. Global growth, transformation, and transformation have brought about 'a great change that has never been seen in a century'. Xi Jinping made a favorable judgment about China's strategic opportunity period after in-depth studying the century-long pattern [15, p.34]. At the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he pointed out 'China's development is still in an important strategic opportunity period with great promise [16].' Therefore, China should seize this period of strategic opportunity. In the face of the uncertainty of world development, China should maintain its strategic determination to unify China's overall development with the fate of all humanity and achieve the strategic goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the construction of the community of human destiny.

Both the domestic and international incentives have driven China to achieve its grand theory. China's domestic environment has shifted from a high-speed way to a high-quality approach in terms of economics. According to the governmental discourse, China's principal social contradiction has become 'the contradiction between the people's growing need for a better life and unbalanced and insufficient development [17].' China will solve the problems of domestic development to accomplish the development goal of building a modernized country. It, thus, makes efforts to guarantee a high-quality developmental way, accumulate and mobilize strategic resources, enhance the ability to resist internal risks, and strive to realize the great dream of rejuvenating the nation. In the context of international arena, China has entered a phase of positive interaction with its relations with the world. The rise of emerging and developing countries has 'changed the original international power contrast,' prompting the international political landscape and the international economic system to be in a period of adjustment. The frequent occurrence of global problems and the trend of counter-globalization have pushed the global governance system into a period of significant change [18, p.20]. Faced with the complexity and uncertainty of the international environment, China has actively adjusted its role from being an 'adaptor' to a 'leader' [15, p.34] in the international system, from being a beneficiary to a contributor in the international economic system, and from being a participant to a 'shaper' in the global governance change. During this strategic opportunity period of 100 years of evolution, China has taken up the responsibility of rising power and proactively worked with the world's people to build a community of human destiny.

From the Chinese perspective, China's grand strategic goal of building a community of human destiny is a great innovation that transcends international strategic theory and traditional Western international relations theory. International strategic theory regards national interests as 'the basis and starting point of strategic decisions [11, p.333]'. The strategic goals of the state and the means to achieve them are determined by national interest. The individual interests of the state become the only indicator for determining

the state's foreign strategic goals. In the traditional Western perspective of international relations, especially the realist one, the self-interest of states and the 'anarchic character' [19] of the international system determine that the individual interests of state actors are always irreconcilable, and competition and conflict become a common phenomenon in world politics. The universality of using force to advance national interests makes war an 'eternal theme' [20]. The goal of national strategy, defined by 'interests defined by power [21],' is to increase power and achieve security. As Craig Snyder [22] points out, 'strategy is concerned with the actual use or threatened use of power in international relations.' Thus, in the perspective of realism and international strategic theory, common interests between states do not exist or are not valued by states. International politics is an arena filled with strategic games between the great powers in the international system.

The Western liberal theoretical tradition, while recognizing the existence of common interests among states and believing that the acquisition of absolute benefits can be facilitated through trade, is unable to reconcile the tension between individual interests and the overall interests of the international community. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that common interests among states can lead to the construction of international mechanisms, which have a functional role in guaranteeing international cooperation. States reconstruct their self-interest at the cognitive level through participation and learning in international agencies [23]. However, institutional liberalism does not change the theoretical base of its assumption of state egoism. Under this logic, the state always prioritizes individual national interests, treating its interests in isolation from others and even from the international community's interests. Even if the state provides regional or global public goods to the international community, its fundamental purpose is still self-interest or power acquisition. When the 'costs of responsibility offset the benefits of power [24, p.37]', states will withdraw from international mechanisms and become reluctant to take responsibility for providing material or institutional public goods, and the international community will fall into the 'Kindleberger trap [25]'. Even though the frequency of global problems poses a threat to the international community as a whole, and the importance of international cooperation has been highlighted [26], states still choose to act in a limited manner, taking into account the common good, while not posing a threat to their interests. This 'actor's dilemma [27]' has created an insurmountable problem in the field of global governance, so Western global governance theory has turned to emphasize the role and role of non-state actors, weakening the critical role that states should play in global governance and trying to propose effective governance solutions through paradigm reform [28].

Chinese scholars emphasize the differentiation of Chinese thinking from the West. They point out that the practice of world politics is bound to fall into the power struggle or conflict of interests if all actors follow the logic of traditional Western theories, which demonstrates an 'old order view [29]'. They have keenly revealed the 'individual rationality', which is the root of the traditional Western thinking of the 'old order view'. The 'individual rationality' logic has caused the global action dilemma. International cooperation driven by 'individual rationality', whether it is an alliance, a quasi-alliance, a regional community, a domain community, and even a worldwide community, is exclusive in nature, strategic and instrumental in character, and therefore fragile and unstable, and cannot escape from the 'logic of collective action' [29]. The 'individual rationality' approach to the state's foreign strategic vision inevitably emphasizes the conflict and confrontation between states, and the zero-sum game of power and checks and balances in the state's foreign strategy, as in the case of Western theories. This 'individual rationality' mode of thinking is negative in both explaining international interactions and guiding international practices. Therefore, it is particularly important to propose ideas that transcend Western concepts and stereotypes for the benign transformation of the international order and the realization of global ethical values.

By contrast, the idea of 'community with a shared future for mankind' is a diplomatic concept with Chinese characteristics that significantly contribute to the common welfare of the world. President Xi once pointed out that our bodies and heads need to 'keep pace with the times' and cannot 'stay in the old framework of cold war thinking and zero-sum thinking [30]'. Therefore, China has put forward the great idea and takes it as a long-term strategic goal for China and a 'Chinese solution' for where the world is heading. With the inclusion of 'building a community of human destiny' in the UN resolution, this concept with Chinese characteristics has been understood and recognized by more and more countries. This idea is the basis of China's profound traditional culture and millennium-old social and ethical practices. It is characterized by 'relational rationality [24, pp. 38-39.]'. The 'relational rationality' has the cultural origin of the traditional culture of the Zhou Dynasty, the system of the world, the hundred schools of thought, and the 'differential

pattern' of Chinese society. 'The relationship between the self and the other is placed in the same spatial, temporal system, and thinking system. The self relies on the other, so the interests of the self and the other cannot separate. Because 'relational rationality' is 'the fundamental purpose of constructing, maintaining or improving relationships,' the state is guided by 'relational rationality' to focus on long-term interests rather than short-term interests. Therefore, following the logic of 'relational rationality,' states focus on long-term rather than short-term interests and emphasize the shape of their relationships and identities. The state recognizes and considers the interests of other international actors to maintain long-term positive interactions, emphasizing the indivisibility of the interaction space (the international community) and the network of relations, the authenticity of shared interests, and the ethical requirement of responsibility. The state's interests are acquired in relations and realized in the international community's interest as a whole. The logic of 'relational rationality' can eliminate the tension between individual interests and the interests of the international community as a whole and escape from the dilemma of 'collective action logic'.

The construction of a 'community with a shared future for mankind' becomes inevitable due to the logic of 'relational rationality.' In the construction process, a network of interconnected relations is formed based on symbiotic tie between actors, who act on the premise of balancing 'righteousness' and 'profit.' The harmonious and stable relationship is consolidated. Therefore, the concept of 'community with a shared future for mankind' transcends the traditional Western ideas, which is the only way to get out of the dilemma, ensure deep cooperation in global governance, promote the 'benign evolution of global order,' and realize 'true global values' [29, p.61]. At the same time, actions under the concept of 'community with a shared future for mankind' can eliminate strategic doubts among different countries, promote trust among nations, and reduce the risk of inter-state conflicts under the logic of 'individual rationality.' For China, the concept of the 'human community with a shared future for mankind' is a primary strategic goal to embed national interests into the international community's common interests and achieve its development in a stable global order and positive interaction.

The approaches of omnidirectional foreign policy

The achievement of the macro-strategic goal of building a community with a shared future for mankind depends on realizing operational goals. Stable relations among major powers, friendly neighboring relations, and the construction of regional systems are inevitable requirements for constructing a community with a shared future for mankind are also necessary elements for consideration in the SREB.

Priority of great power relations

Great power relations are important factors for the success of China's SREB construction. Scholars of neo-realism in international relations believe that great powers are the most dominant actors in international politics. The distribution of power among them determines the structural features of the international system and the international pattern [19]. Although China's Belt and Road Strategy and the concept of the 'community with a shared future for mankind' are opposed to the theoretical views of realism, the international pattern formed by the interaction among major powers is the external environment for the choice of China's development strategy. From the founding of the country in 1949 to the present, China has made several international strategic adjustments based on the changes in the global landscape. Changes in the relations between the major powers and the strategic expansion and contraction among them are the objective environmental considerations of China's external strategy. This change in the international environment has led to a change in China's security threats, its national interests, and the way to achieve interests. During the Cold War, China formulated and adjusted its foreign policy from the 'China-US-Soviet Union' strategic triangle structure. With the de-escalation and stabilization of U.S.-Soviet relations, China judged that 'peace and development are the themes of the time. Based on this judgment, China established the national strategy of insisting on independence and made the security decision to disarm millions of people. The end of the Cold War disintegrated the bipolar system, and the strategic confrontation between the superpowers in the international system was dissolute. China's security threats from the international system are non-traditional security issues instead of traditional ones [31, p.70], affecting China's strategic goals setting.

The interaction between China and other major powers directly affects the setting of China's 'rising frontier' and the effectiveness of implementing Beijing's international macro strategy. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China's strength and influence have grown fast and considerably compared with other

major powers, and its status has been greatly enhanced. The rise of our country and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a reality and a historical necessity. The collective rise of China and other developing countries will cause a shift in the center of world power. The changes in the structure of the international system and international pattern and the stability of the international order are closely related to the process of interaction between China and other major powers (especially the United States). Under the traditional Western theoretical perspective, such as the 'power shift theory,' the interaction between China and the United States has been simplified and understood as a competition between the 'rising powers' and the 'hegemonic powers' at the regional and global levels. The discussion of the relationship between China and the United States revolves around the 'hegemonic power-rising power [32, p.90] 'binary framework. Under the influence of this mindset, the U.S. strategy toward China tends to be one of checks and balances, with its alliance system in the Asia-Pacific containing the rise of China. As a result, China has fallen into the 'rising model of extraterritorial hegemonic intervention and competition among major powers in the region', which has created a 'rising dilemma [35]' for China. The grand goal of building a community with shared future for mankind is to break away from the traditional Western binary framework of analysis and power competition thinking. The formulation and implementation of operable strategic goals should work under the grand strategy to get out of the 'rising dilemma' and alleviate the structural pressure in the system. The key lies in the interaction between China and the great powers. As Professor Wang Jisi [31, p.73], a well-known strategic thinker, points out, 'China's relationship with other major powers remains the key for China to maintain its core interests.' In short, the strategic choice of the SREB serves China's strategic goals, and the key lies in how to deal with the relationship between China and other major powers.

The importance of Neighborhood Relations

The idea of building a 'community with a shared future for mankind' takes the community of neighboring countries as a testing ground and a forerunner, starting from the periphery. From the perspective of geo-strategy, China's strategic focus is on Asia, and Asia's strategic focus is on the periphery. The prosperity and stability of the periphery provide a benign environment for China's development. In turn, the Chinese believe that Beijing's economic development will inevitably lead to the peace and prosperity of the periphery. China and its neighboring countries have formed a 'mutual strategic reliance [36, p.255]'. Theoretically, when the rising power and the hegemonic power in the international system are in different regions, the rising power faces pressure at the regional level because other competitors or counterbalancing alliances will appear in the area. Under such circumstances, the periphery becomes crucial in the foreign policy decisions of the rising power. It is 'an integral part of the practice of the rising power's strategy to deal with the hegemonic power and the checks and balances of its competitors in the region [32, p.p.97-98]'. For China, the negative effects in geography are the game of the great powers caused by the eastward shift of the global strategic center of gravity on China's rise. The neighboring countries are the breakthroughs to alleviate the structural pressure in the international system in China's rise. The impact of China's rise on the security in the periphery and the complexity of the surrounding areas affect the implementation of its grand strategy. Therefore, China's peaceful rise needs to keep a good relationship with neighboring countries.

Since the 18th Chinese National Congress, the periphery has become the focus of China's omnidirectional diplomacy and an essential part of pursuing a new type of international relations. 2014, General Secretary Xi explicitly proposed 'building a community with a shared future in the periphery [16]' to grasp the focus of peripheral diplomacy. China has deepened its relations with neighboring countries by the slogan of affinity, sincerity, tolerance, and the diplomatic policy of treating neighbors as good and companionship [36, p.240]'. China has formed several communities of destiny with neighboring countries, such as the 'China-ASEAN Community of Destiny [37]', 'China-Arab Community of Destiny [38]' and so on. Building a community of destiny in the neighborhood has become an essential part of the community with a shared future for mankind. The introduction and implementation of the 'Belt and Road' initiative is an important practical carrier and platform for building a community of destiny in the periphery, providing a new way of thinking that transcends the traditional Western geopolitical theory and the logic of power competition. Under the guidance of the values of peace, shared prosperity, and development, the construction of the Belt and Road will enable China and neighboring countries to dovetail and develop, thus creating a new situation of win-win cooperation [39].

The SREB reflects the importance of stabilization and strategic development of the periphery. In history, China's diplomacy has always focused on the direction of the West Pacific. In contrast, former U.S. President Barack Obama's geostrategic strategy of returning to Asia and 'strategic rebalancing' has brought about geopolitical difficulties and pressure on China's development to the West Pacific. So the development strategy of 'looking west' to integrate China's growth with the core countries of Eurasia can ease the geopolitical pressure. From the Chinese perspective, the SREB will benefit nearly half of the world's population of 30 to 40 countries in China's neighborhood countries and Europe. The SREB is a way for China to consider the legitimate concerns of other countries while realizing its interests, deepen the strategic fit and common interests between China and its neighbors, and point to mutually beneficial cooperation with the goal of joint development. As the advocate of the SREB, China is embedding its development into regional destiny, safeguarding its security, and maintaining a stable development environment by acquiring the overall interests of its neighbors and the region. Through the SREB construction, China's economic, technical and financial cooperation and trade ties with the neighboring areas could significantly strengthened, and cooperation has become more in-depth.

Moreover, it can eliminate the passive situation of being too dependent on the U.S. and Japanese markets. On the other hand, it can also form a close relationship of mutual benefit to reduce unnecessary hostility and fear of neighboring countries due to the rise of China. Therefore, how to deal with the neighboring relations is an essential target for consideration in the strategic choice of China's SREB construction.

The necessity of regional system

Regional system construction is a critical path for our country to manage the periphery and one of the institutional guarantees for realizing the strategic goal of the community of human destiny. From the theoretical point of view, regional institutional construction can stabilize the cooperation between China and neighboring countries and play an essential role in realizing the community of destiny in the periphery. IR Neoliberal institutionalists propose that institutions among interdependent states can avoid conflict and solidify cooperation. Because formal or informal international regimes serve the function of reducing deception, increasing transparency, creating networking platforms, and reducing transaction costs, states are driven by self-interest to make policy adjustments that lead to the establishment, maintenance, and compliance with international regimes. Under a given international regime, states develop a state of interest coordination. Through their participation in that international regime and the interaction between states under a given regime platform, state actors can reshape their perception of interests. Although the individual rationality of states at the root of the creation of international mechanisms or international regimes in the neo-institutional realist theory determines their instability and precariousness, specific international regimes play a role in responding to collective action problems. Kindleberger and Robert Gilpin [40] suggested that the public goods provided by the hegemonic state (the great power) are necessary for achieving international cooperation. But they have not resolved the problems of the instability of international regimes, which even cause the so-called 'Kindleberger trap' with the decline of the hegemonic state. IR constructivism can further extend the role of the neo-liberal system theory on the system. Constructivists argue that the international system provides a platform for interaction and cooperation among states. Then through this platform, the effect of international socialization on nations help promote the international community, i.e., states reshape their identity in the interaction, and then change their perception of their interests, and through the redefinition of identity between the self and the other, break down the self and the other. The binary boundary between the self and the other breaks down by redefining their identities. The other is integrated into the self, thus generating a sense of community and contributing to the community formation [41-42].

A regional institution within the East Asian region is necessary for constructing 'the community with a shared future for mankind.' China's rise has objectively reshaped the regional power pattern and triggered the threat perception of neighboring countries to our country [43]. Participation in constructing a regional regime is an approach that China provides public good as a regional power. This process can institutionalize economic and security cooperation between China and neighboring countries, strengthen mutual trust, and eliminate the neighboring nations' misperception of China's threat through stable frequent collaboration and interaction. In addition, institutionalized regional cooperation expands common interests between China and neighboring countries, strengthens their perception of mutual existence, thus forming a preliminary security community, economic community, and eventually a community of destiny.

China has accumulated a lot of experience in regional governance and developed a unique regional governance concept through its participation in the regional institution building in East Asia. It has put forward the idea of regional security architecture, which has provided an overall view and concept for constructing regional systems. China's regional system construction also starts from the periphery, and both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Lan-Me Cooperation are part of the systematic system construction and strategic initiatives. The regional institution building is a strategic consensus that has been formed in the course of the BRI, which aims to provide a 'mutually beneficial cooperation, a new model of cooperation, and a diversified cooperation platform [44, p.108]'. The SREB has already acquired the elements of an international system. The implementation of the SREB depends on the convergence of interests and cooperation of the large neighboring countries under a specific international regime. Therefore, the strategic choice of China's SREB relies on building regional institutions. The effect of aggregation and cooperation in regional regimes and mechanisms will contribute to achieving the community with a shared future for mankind.

Conclusion

China's SREB is a strategic program that the Chinese government has initiated based on its geographical environment. Although academics, observers, and media have viewed the program from different perspectives and debated on the motivation and impact, the Chinese government insists that the program serves Beijing's grand strategy. In Chinese diplomatic discourse, constructing a community with a shared future for mankind is the grand strategy and guiding slogan for its foreign policies. This slogan has attracted intense international and domestic audiences. The Chinese government and academic circle have made a great effort to justify this strategy, demonstrating its meaningfulness and values. They explore Chinese traditional culture to show the logic and philosophy underlying the concept of 'the community with a shared future for mankind' are disassociated with its Western counterparts; thus, it can overcome the latter's defect and contribute to international peace and stability. While the guiding slogan may not undergird international audience's trust in China [45], it is still admired by the domestic audience. To strengthen its credibility of the strategy, China must find ways to keep the promise and take the responsibility as a rising power.

Three concrete approaches to building the SREB are also essential parts of China's omnidirectional diplomacy. The Chinese government has prioritized its relations with the great powers, including the US, Russia, etc. With the increasing tense between China and the US, the neighboring nations have increasingly become important for China's security and the construction of the SREB. Moreover, regional regimes and mechanisms can solidify the cooperation between China and the nations along the SREB. China will proactively participate in the construction of the regimes. Russia is critical for China's SREB and grand strategy in all three approaches. In the seeable future, China will enhance its relations with Russia and hope to maintain regional stability with the help of Russia.

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ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОГО ДИСКУРСА КИТАЯ:

СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ЦЕЛИ И ПОДХОДЫ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОГО ПОЯСА ШЕЛКОВОГО ПУТИ

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Экономический пояс Шелкового пути КНР – это геостратегическая программа, которая была инициирована на основе суждения Пекина о его международной и внутренней обстановке. Создание программы ЭППП соответствует великой стратегии Китая и удовлетворяет его национальным требованиям. Китайское правительство объявило "сообщество единой судьбы человечества" национальной великой стратегией и руководящим лозунгом своей внешней политики. В этой статье интерпретируется правительственный дискурс Китая о руководящем лозунге и китайских академических усилиях по обоснованию великой стратегии. С точки зрения Китая, при строительстве ЭППП необходимо использовать всенаправленную дипломатию, которая включает в себя урегулирование отношений с великими державами, с соседними странами и создание региональных режимов и механизмов. Великая стратегия Китая и обозначенные три подхода в какой-то степени кажутся идеальными, но они демонстрируют реальные озабоченности и идеи Китая. В долгосрочной перспективе Россия будет становиться все более и более значимой для китайской программы ЭППП и для великой стратегии в целом.

Ключевые слова: Экономический пояс Шелкового пути, Китайская инициатива «Пояс и путь», большая стратегия, всенаправленная внешняя политика.

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